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作者：Fershtman, Chaim; Segal, Uzi
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Boston College; University of Warwick
摘要：Interaction between decision makers may affect their preferences. We consider a setup in which each individual is characterized by two sets of preferences: his unchanged core preferences and his behavioral preferences. Each individual has a social influence function that determines his behavioral preferences given his core preferences and the behavioral preferences of other individuals in his group. Decisions are made according to behavioral preferences. The paper considers different propertie...
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作者：Guerrieri, Veronica; Shimer, Robert
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper explores price formation when sellers are privately informed about their preferences and the quality of their asset. There are many equilibria, including a semi-separating one in which each seller's price depends on a one-dimensional index of her preferences and asset quality. This multiplicity does not rely on off-the-equilibrium path beliefs and so is not amenable to standard signaling game refinements. The semi-separating equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient, even if it is not...
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作者：Heinsalu, Sander
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This article studies costly signaling. The signaling effort is chosen in multiple periods and observed with noise. The signaler benefits front the belief of the market, not directly from the effort or the signal. Optimal signaling behavior in time-varying environments trades off effort-smoothing and influencing belief exactly when it yields a return. If the return to signaling first increases over time and then decreases, then the optimal effort rises slowly, reaches its maximum before the ret...
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作者：Flach, Lisandra; Irlacher, Michael
作者单位：University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We investigate the effects of better access to foreign markets on innovation strategies of multiproduct firms in industries with different scope for product differentiation. Industry-specific demand and cost linkages induce a distinction between the returns to innovation. In differentiated industries, cannibalization is lower and firms invest more in product innovation. In homogeneous industries, firms internalize intra-firm spillovers and invest more in process innovation. Using firm-level da...
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作者：Lipnowski, Elliot; Mathevet, Laurent
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：We study how a benevolent expert should disclose information to an agent with psychological concerns. We first provide a method to compute an optimal information policy for many psychological traits. The method suggests, for instance, that an agent suffering from temptation a la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) should not know what he is missing, thereby explaining observed biases as an optimal reaction to costly self-control. We also show that simply recommending actions is optimal when the agent i...
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作者：Zhu, John Y.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In many jobs, the worker generates only subjective performance measures privately observed by the employer, and contracts must rely on employer reports about these measures. This setting is a game with private monitoring, and prior work suggests that the optimal contract may be complex and non-recursive. I introduce a novel equilibrium refinement and show that the optimal contract simplifies to an efficiency wage contract: The worker receives a wage above his outside option and reports take a ...
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作者：Harbaugh, Rick; Rasmusen, Eric
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Certifiers of quality often report only coarse grades to the public despite having measured quality more finely, e.g., Pass or Certified instead of 73 out of 100. Why? We show that coarse grades result in more information being provided to the public because the coarseness encourages those of middling quality to apply for certification. Dropping exact grading in favor of the best coarse grading scheme reduces public uncertainty because the extra participation outweighs the coarser reporting. I...
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作者：Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard; Sarpca, Sinan
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Koc University
摘要：A model of majority choice of voucher characteristics with quantitative counterpart explains observed income eligibility requirements for educational vouchers. Households differ by income and preference for religious schooling. They elect a policy maker who chooses public school expenditure, a voucher, a maximum income for voucher eligibility, and a tax to finance public expenditure. Equilibrium has a voucher below per student public expenditure, an eligibility threshold near 300 percent of th...
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作者：Andreoni, James
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The fear of moral hazard-especially in the age of internet commerce-can depress or prevent profitable trades. Experiments show, however, that many people prefer honesty to deceit and would not succumb to moral hazard. This paper asks whether we can find a simple, voluntary institution that can empower moral traders, drive out amoral ones, reduce moral hazard, and restore profitable trade to markets. I find that selling goods with a satisfaction guarantee, accompanied by potentially minor legal...
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作者：Chen, Ying-Ju; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Monash University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider a network model where individuals exert efforts in two types of activities that are interdependent. These activities can be either substitutes or complements. We provide a full characterization of the Nash equilibrium of this game for any network structure. We show, in particular, that quadratic games with linear best-reply functions aggregate nicely to multiple activities because equilibrium efforts obey similar formulas to that of the one-activity case. We then derive some compar...
