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作者：Bertoletti, Paolo; Etro, Federico; Simonovska, Ina
作者单位：University of Pavia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We develop a general equilibrium model of trade that features indirectly additive preferences and heterogeneous firms. Monopolistic competition generates markups that are increasing in firm productivity and in destination country per capita income, but independent from destination population, as documented empirically. The gains from trade liberalization are lower than in models hosed on CES preferences, and the difference is governed by the average pass-through. When we calibrate the model so...
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作者：Igami, Mitsuru
摘要：This paper uncovers a novel pattern of offshoring dynamics in a high-tech industry, and proposes a structural model to explain it. Specifically, the hard disk drive industry (1976-1998) witnessed massive waves of entry, exit, and the relocation of manufacturing plants to low-cost countries, in which shakeouts occurred predominantly among home firms and almost all survivors were offshore firms. I build and estimate a dynamic offshoring game with entry/exit to measure the benefits and costs of o...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Glasgow
摘要：Karni and Viero (2013) present an interesting theory of decisions in the presence of new actions and consequences. We establish results on the observable implications of the model. When introducing new consequences, arbitrary preference reversals over feasible actions are permitted. This occurs even if an outside observer can uniquely pin down the decision maker's ordinal ranking over consequences.
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作者：Fehrler, Sebastian; Hughes, Niall
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of London; King's College London
摘要：We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate, and vote. We study three-levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently and test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out-transparency negatively affects informat...
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作者：Galavotti, Stefano; Moretti, Luigi; Valbonesi, Paola
作者单位：University of Padua; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We study bidding behavior by firms in beauty-contest auctions, i.e., auctions in which the winning bid is the one that gets closest to some function (average) of all submitted bids. Using a dataset on public procurement beauty-contest auctions, we show that firms' observed bidding behavior departs from equilibrium and can be predicted by a sophistication index, which captures the firms' capacity of bidding close to optimality in the past. We show that our empirical evidence is consistent with ...
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作者：Krasnokutskaya, Elena; Terwiesch, Christian; Tiererova, Lucia
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We invoke the insights from the auction literature to study trade in services using data from an online market for programming support. We find that the observed clustering of trade between countries can be rationalized through a model featuring endogenous sorting of sellers who are heterogeneous in both quality and costs across projects offered by buyers who differ in outside option and willingness to pay for quality. To accommodate the possibility of such an outcome we extend a single-auctio...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Horner, Johannes
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime, each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium, the allocation is efficient, and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings wher...
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作者：Drexl, Moritz; Kleiner, Andreas
作者单位：University of Bonn; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：A committee decides collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to maintain the status quo. Committee members are privately informed about their valuations and monetary transfers are possible. According to which rule should the committee make its decision? We consider strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms and solve for the decision rule that maximizes utilitarian welfare, which takes monetary transfers to an external agency explicitly into account. For regular distributions of prefere...
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作者：Sandroni, Alvaro; Urgun, Can
作者单位：Northwestern University; Princeton University
摘要：This paper examines the effects of patience on ordinary conflicts such as divorce, price wars, and commercial litigation. Players optimally decide when, if ever, to start a destructive confrontation. In the unique equilibrium, there is a tight connection between patience, aggressiveness, and strength. In particular, patience may lead to immediate confrontation (the most inefficient outcome). This inefficiency is caused by preemptive moves that deny option values to the opponent.
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作者：Samphantharak, Krislert; Townsend, Robert M.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper provides a theory-based empirical framework for understanding the risk and return on productive capital assets and their allocation across activities in an economy characterized by idiosyncratic and aggregate risk and thin formal markets for real and financial assets. We apply our framework to households running business enterprises in Thai villages with extensive networks, taking advantage of panel data: income, assets, consumption, gifts, and loans. We decompose risk and estimate ...
