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作者：Schummer, James; Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even wizen the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others' preferences. We pr...
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作者：Millner, Antony; Heyen, Daniel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：Commentators often lament forecasters' inability to provide precise predictions of the long-run behavior of complex economic and physical systems. Yet their concerns often conflate the presence of substantial long-run uncertainty with the need for long-run predictability; short-run predictions can partially substitute for long-run predictions if decision-makers can adjust their activities over time. So what is the relative importance of short- and long-run predictability? We study this questio...
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作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous o...
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作者：Shelegia, Sandro; Wilson, Chris M.
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Loughborough University
摘要：To better understand temporary price reductions or sales, this paper presents a generalized clearinghouse framework of advertised sales and explores some applications. By viewing the firms as competing in utility and amending the conventional tiebreak rule, we allow for multiple dimensions of firm heterogeneity in complex market environments. Moreover, we (i) provide original insights into the number and types of firms that use sales, (ii) offer new results on how firm heterogeneity affects ma...
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作者：Guo, Huiyi; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Iowa
摘要：This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient co...
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作者：Thomas, Caroline D.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper considers a two-player game of strategic experimentation with competition. Each agent faces a two-armed bandit problem where she continually chooses between her private, risky arm and a common, safe arm. Each agent has exclusive access to her private arm. However, the common arm can only be activated by one agent at a time. This congestion creates negative payoff externalities. Our main finding is that congestion gives rise to new strategic considerations: players perceive a strateg...
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作者：Lemus, Jorge; Temnyalov, Emil; Turner, John L.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Technology Sydney; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：In liability lawsuits (e.g., patent infringement), a plaintiff demands compensation from a defendant, and the parties often negotiate a settlement to avoid a costly trial. Liability insurance creates bargaining leverage for the defendant in this settlement negotiation. We study the characteristics of monopoly and equilibrium contracts in settings where this leverage effect is a substantial source of value for insurance. Our results show that under adverse selection, a monopolist offers at most...
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作者：Wittwer, Milena
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：In most financial markets, securities are traded in isolation. Such a disconnected market design can be inefficient if agents trade more than one security. I assess welfare effects of connecting markets by allowing orders for one security to depend on prices of other securities. I show that everyone trades identical amounts under both market structures if and only if the clearing prices are perfectly correlated or all are price-takers. Prices in disconnected markets might allow strategic trade...
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作者：Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study the optimal intervention policy to stop projects in a relational contract between a principal and a policymaker. The policymaker is privately informed about his ability and privately chooses how much effort to exert. Before a project is completed, the principal receives a signal about its outcome and can intervene to stop it. Intervention may prevent a bad outcome, but no intervention leads to better learning about the policymaker's ability. In the benchmarks with observable effort or...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Cseh, Agnes; Ehlers, Lars; Erlanson, Albin
作者单位：Lund University; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; University of Potsdam; Universite de Montreal; University of Essex
摘要：This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., unbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation that maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and tho...
