Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andersson, Tommy; Cseh, Agnes; Ehlers, Lars; Erlanson, Albin
• 署名单位: Lund University; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; University of Potsdam; Universite de Montreal; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180236
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 338-373
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; STABILITY; allocation; DESIGN

摘要

This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., unbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation that maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable, agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.