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作者：Fukuda, Satoshi; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study negotiations with limited specifiability-each party may not be able to fully specify a negotiation outcome. We construct a class of negotiation protocols to conduct comparative statics on specifiability as well as move structures. We find that asynchronicity of proposal announcements narrows down the equilibrium payoff set, in particular, leading to a unique prediction in negotiations with a common interest alternative. The equilibrium payoff set is not a singleton in general, and dep...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：University of Vienna; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Southern Methodist University
摘要：Information regulation that penalizes deceptive communication by firms can have significant unintended consequences. We consider a market where competing firms communicate private information about product quality through a combination of pricing and direct communication (advertising or labeling) that may be false. A higher fine for lying reduces the reliance on price signaling, thereby lowering market power and consumption distortions; however, it may lead to excessive disclosure. Low fines a...
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作者：Heim, Sven; Hueschelrath, Kai; Laitenberger, Ulrich; Spiegel, Yossi
作者单位：Universite PSL; MINES ParisTech; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We address the growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may lessen competition, using the introduction of national leniency programs (LPs) as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements. Based on data from 63 countries, we find a large and significant immediate increase in domestic horizontal MS acquisitions once an LP is introduced but only in countries where the LP is deemed to be effective. There is no effect on non-horizontal or cross-border MS acquisitions. Our fi...
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作者：Acharya, Avidit; Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Stanford University; Boston University
摘要：We construct a model of collective search in which players gradually approach the Pareto frontier. The players have imperfect control over which improvements to the status quo will be considered. Inefficiency takes place due to the difficulty in finding improvements acceptable to both parties. The process is path dependent, with early agreements determining long-run outcomes. It may also be cyclical, as players alternate between being more and less accommodating.
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作者：Ghani, Tarek; Reed, Tristan
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); The World Bank
摘要：Firms use relational contracts to support repeated trade. Do these informal agreements evolve in response to market conditions? In a market for ice, firms reestablish relationships on new terms when a prior agreement breaks down. Using transaction data, we show that ice retailers prioritize deliveries to loyal buyers-fishing firms when supply from the monopolistic manufacturer is scarce. After an upstream shock to competition increases supply, repeated trade lapses, threatening retailers' posi...
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作者：Denter, Philipp; Morgan, John; Sisak, Dana
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We analyze the incentives for showing off , which we model as a costly signaling game , and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest , a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium , costly signaling of ability occurs only when the newcomer is exceptionally talented. In such situations signaling benefits both contestants: the newcomer for obvious reasons; the incumbent by economizing on wasted effort in the contest. Our results r...
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作者：Fong, Yuk-fai; Liu, Ting; Meng, Xiaoxuan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We study trust building in credence-goods markets in a dynamic setting. When consumers' expected loss is low and it is efficient to fix only the more severe problem, there is no trade in the one-shot game. In the repeated game, an expert's honesty is monitored through consumers' rejection of his recommendations. The expert's profit in the optimal equilibrium weakly increases in the discount factor but does not achieve the first best, which contrasts sharply with the optimal equilibrium in expe...
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作者：Kostadinov, Rumen; Kuvalekar, Aditya
作者单位：McMaster University; University of Essex
摘要：We study relational contracts between a firm and a worker with mutual uncertainty about match quality. The worker's actions are publicly observed and generate both output and information about the match quality. We show that the relational contracts may be inefficient. We characterize the inefficiency through a holdup problem on the contemporaneous output. In the frequent action limit, these inefficiencies persist if and only if information degrades at least at the same rate at which impatienc...
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作者：Friedman, Evan
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We introduce noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) for normal-form games in which players best respond to noisy belief realizations. Axioms restrict belief distributions to be unbiased with respect to and responsive to changes in the opponents' behavior. The axioms impose testable restrictions both within and across games, and we compare these restrictions to those of regular quantal response equi-librium (QRE) in which axioms are placed on the quantal response function as the primitive. NBE can gene...
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作者：Hernandez, Penelope; Neeman, Zvika
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Valencia; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider the question of how best to allocate enforcement resources across different locations with the goal of deterring unwanted behavior. We rely on Bayesian persuasion to improve deterrence. We focus on the case where agents care only about the expected amount of enforcement resources given messages received. Optimization in the space of induced mean posterior beliefs involves a partial convexification of the objective function. We describe inter-pretable conditions under which it is po...
