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作者：Fioretti, Michele; Vostroknutov, Alexander; Coricelli, Giorgio
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Maastricht University; University of Southern California
摘要：In a stock market experiment, we examine how regret avoidance influences the decision to sell an asset while its price changes over time. Participants know beforehand whether they will observe the future prices after they sell the asset or not. Without future prices, participants are affected only by regret about previously observed high prices (past regret), but when future prices are available, they also avoid regret about expected after-sale high prices (future regret). Moreover, as the rel...
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作者：Frankel, Alexander; Kasy, Maximilian
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Oxford
摘要：Given a scarcity of journal space, what is the optimal rule for whether an empirical finding should be published? Suppose publications inform the public about a policy-relevant state. Then journals should publish extreme results, meaning ones that move beliefs sufficiently. This optimal rule may take the form of a one-or two-sided test comparing a point estimate to the prior mean, with critical values determined by a cost-benefit analysis. Consideration of future studies may additionally justi...
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作者：Perez-Saiz, Hector; Xiao, Hongyu
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; University of Pennsylvania; Bank of Canada
摘要：We estimate a perfect information static entry game to study the effect of cultural entry barriers on entry and competition in the retail banking industry. Canada provides a favorable setting for analysis due to its high linguistic diversity, concentrated market, and regulatory entry barriers. We find that cultural affinity between customers and financial institutions that share a common cultural origin plays an important role in explaining the comparative advantages of these institutions in c...
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作者：Dur, Umut; Pathak, Parag A.; Song, Fei; Sonmez, Tayfun
作者单位：North Carolina State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：This paper analyzes the Taiwan mechanism used nationwide for high school assignment starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score, with larger penalties for lower-ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a hybrid of the Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless remains in use.
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作者：Fuchs, William; Green, Brett; Levine, David
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A large literature examines demand-side barriers to product adoption. In this paper, we examine supply-side barriers in a setting with limited contract enforcement. We model the relationship between a distributor and its credit-constrained vendors. We show that the optimal self-enforcing arrangement can be implemented by providing vendors with a line of credit and the option to buy additional units at a fixed price. Moreover, the structure of this arrangement is optimal both for profit-maximiz...
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作者：Blavatskyy, Pavlo; Ortmann, Andreas; Panchenko, Valentyn
作者单位：Montpellier Business School; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：The Allais Paradox, or the common consequence effect, is a well-known behavioral regularity in individual decision-making under risk. Data from 81 experiments reported in 29 studies reveal that the Allais Paradox is a fragile empirical finding. The Allais Paradox is likely to be observed in experiments with high hypothetical payoffs, the medium outcome being close to the highest outcome and when lotteries are presented as a probability distribution (not in a compound form). The Allais Paradox ...
