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作者：Gieczewski, German
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：I study a dynamic model of electoral competition between candidates with heterogeneous valence. When the candidates' and voters' policy preferences differ, the winner extracts rents, limited only by the voters' threat of electing the weaker candidate. This threat becomes more costly to the voters when the relevant time horizon is longer. Thus, term limits can increase the voters' bargaining power and their welfare. Term limits are even more important for curbing rent extraction if entry is str...
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作者：Nagy, David Krisztian
作者单位：Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：I study how trade affects urbanization and real income. To this end, I exploit large-scale exogenous changes in trade stemming from the redrawing of Hungary's borders after the First World War. I show that urbanization in counties near the new border decreased significantly relative to counties farther away. I rationalize this reduced-form finding in a spatial model in which benefits from trading drive agglomeration around locations where trading activity takes place. Structurally estimating t...
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作者：Schiffer, Burkhard C.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We show there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable, or that could learn itself Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach a learning opponent to secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff This observation holds even when we restrict to generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements, or 2 x 2 games, in which learning is kno...
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作者：Terstiege, Stefan; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Basel
摘要：We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally designed auctions. In a single-object auction environment, we assume that before the revenue-maximizing auctioneer designs the auction, bidders noncooperatively choose signal structures that disclose information about their valuations. We show that an equilibrium exists in this two-stage game and that in every equilibrium the object is sold with probability one. Our main result concerns the consequen...
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作者：Cumbul, Eray
作者单位：TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University
摘要：We study quadratic payoff common-value sequential-move aggregative games with signaling. Applications include Stackelberg quantity-setting, public good contribution, common resource, gas emission, and manufacturer-retailer games. Whereas efficient aggregation of information occurs in large Stackelberg markets, it does not occur in the four remaining large markets. If all agents share their information with their followers, expected welfare increases in the Stackelberg and supply chain games an...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Rozen, Kareen
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We experimentally investigate how impartial observers allocate money to agents whose complernentarity and substitutability determine the surplus that each group can achieve. Analyzing the data through the lens of axioms and solutions from cooperative game theory, a one-parameter model (mixing equal split and Shapley value) arises as a parsimonious description of the data.
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作者：Ederer, Florian; Schneider, Frederic
作者单位：Yale University; University of Birmingham
摘要：Using a large-scale hybrid laboratory and online trust experiment with and without preplay communication, we investigate how the passage of time affects trust. Communication (predominantly through promises) raises cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness by about 50 percent. This result holds even when three weeks pass between the time of the trustee's message/the trustor's decision to trust and the time of the trustee's contribution choice and even when this contribution choice is made outside...
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作者：Hansen, Emanuel
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on politi-cal platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter mode...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We show that the treatment effect estimated by standard methods such as regression discontinuity analysis or difference-in-differences may contain a transient ???learning effect??? that is entangled with the long-term effect of the treatment. This learning effect occurs when the variable of interest is the agents???efforts, when treatment and con-trol correspond to success or failure: success or failure gives agents information about how much their effort matters, and consequently changes the ...
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作者：Mercadal, Ignacia
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：I study the effects of financial players who trade alongside physical buyers and sellers in electricity markets. Using detailed firm-level data, I examine physical and financial firrns' responses to regulation that exogenously increased financial trading. I show that the effect of speculators on generators' market power depends on the kind of equilibrium they are in. I develop a test of the null of static Nash equilibrium and reject it. To implement the test, I present a new method to define m...
