-
作者：MacKay, Alexander
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of re-selecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this trade-off and provide an empirical strategy for quantifying (unobserved) transaction costs. I estimate the model using federal supply contracts for a standardized product, where suppliers are selected by procurement auctions. The estimated trans...
-
作者：Choi, Albert H.; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Harvard University
摘要：When firms collude and charge supracompetitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low, firms accept the cost as just another cost of doing business, whereas when the cost is high, the firms lower the price to deter litigation. Class action is modeled as a mechanism that allows plaintiffs and attorneys to obtain economies of scale. We show that class actions, and the firms' incentive to block them, may or may not be socially desirable. ...
-
作者：Dragone, Davide; Vanin, Paolo
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：We consider a broad class of intertemporal economic problems and characterize the short-run and long-run responses of the demand for a good to a permanent increase in its market price. Depending on the interplay between self-productivity and time discounting, we show that dynamic substitution effects can generate price elasticities of opposite signs in the short run and in the long run.
-
作者：Tyazhelnikov, Vladimir
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：I introduce a model of international production that allows the production chain to be of any length or number of sourcing countries and in which the production process does not have to be perfectly sequential. The presence of trade costs in this model makes firms cluster their production geographically, while trade liberalization allows firms to fragment their production more. Clustering patterns depend on the characteristics of the production structure, with stronger clustering associated wi...
-
作者：DellaVigna, Stefano; Pope, Devin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：How robust are experimental results to changes in design? And can researchers anticipate which changes matter most? We consider a real-effort task with multiple behavioral treatments and examine the stability along six dimensions: (i) pure replication, (ii) demographics, (iii) geography and culture, (iv) the task, (v) the output measure, and (vi) the presence of a consent form. We find near-perfect replication of the experimental results and full stability of the results across demographics, s...
-
作者：Kovach, Matthew; Tserenjigmid, Gerelt
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We introduce the Focal Luce Model (FLM), a random choice model that generalizes Luce's (1959) model (multinomial logit) to account for menu-dependent focality of alternatives. In the FLM, focal alter-natives are relatively more likely to be chosen even after taking utili-ties into account. The FLM captures a variety of bounded rationality models while behaviorally distinguishing between what is focal and the magnitude of the bias from focality. We show how to identify util-ities, focal sets, a...
-
作者：Migrow, Dmitri; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：University of Calgary; University of British Columbia
摘要：We study the interaction between productive investment and per-suasion activities in a principal???agent setting with strategic dis-closure. In an attempt to persuade the principal, the agent diverts substantial resources from productive activities to information acquisition for persuasion, even though productive activities are more efficient and raise the chances of success in persuasion. The equilibrium outcomes of simultaneous and sequential allocation procedures are the same, because the v...
-
作者：Teh, Tat-How
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：Platforms that intermediate trades-such as Amazon, Airbnb, and eBay-play a regulatory role in deciding how to govern the marketplaces they create. We propose a framework to analyze a platform's nonprice governance design and its incentive to act in a welfare-enhancing manner. We show that the platform's governance design can be distorted toward inducing insufficient or excessive seller competition, depending on the nature of the fee instrument employed by the platform. These results are illust...
-
作者：Thiel, Jurre H.
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：To prevent biased advice, regulators increasingly ban commission payments to financial advisers. Such bans are associated with advice gaps, meaning that advice becomes less accessible. To understand the trade-off between the quality and accessibility of advice, this paper develops a model of price competition in advice markets with endogenous entry of advisers. While commission bans increase consumer surplus in the short run, they hurt the profitability of advisers. In the long run, advisers e...
-
作者：Antler, Yair; Bachi, Benjamin
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa
摘要：We study a model of two-sided search in which agents' strategic reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while for all other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to their prospects in the market. Consequently, they search longer than is optimal. Moreover, agents with intermediate match values may search indefinitely while all other agents eventually marry. We show that the share of eternal singles converges mo...
