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作者：Antler, Yair; Bird, Daniel; Oliveros, Santiago
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; University of Bristol
摘要：We develop a model in which two players sequentially and publicly examine a project. In our model the player who moves first can fab-ricate evidence to influence the second mover, which creates a moral hazard problem. We find that early strategic uncertainty can mitigate this problem. In particular, for intermediate prior beliefs about the project's quality, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is in mixed strat-egies and consists of an early stage in which evidence may be fabri-cated and a later s...
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作者：Evans, Robert; Reiche, Sonje
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; Yale University
摘要：We compare contrarian to conformist advice, a contrarian expert being one whose preference bias is against the decision-maker's prior optimal decision. Optimality of an expert depends on char-acteristics of prior information and learning. If either the expert is fully informed or fine information can be acquired cheaply, then for symmetric distributions F of the state, a conformist (contrarian) is superior if F is single peaked (bimodal). If only coarse informa-tion can be acquired, then a con...
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作者：Levin, Dan; Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We characterize the optimal misbehavior by bidding rings or an auc-tioneer in the ascending English auction with common values. We also show, in an extended game, that in equilibrium potential members join and truthfully reveal their signals. Under a separability assump-tion, behavior does not change if nonring bidders are informed about the ring's existence. In general, misbehavior in dynamic settings is more profitable than in outcome-equivalent static settings. However, under a stronger sep...
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作者：Dressler, Luisa; Weiergraeber, Stefan
作者单位：Solvay SA; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We quantify how switching costs and limited awareness affect con-sumer inertia in liberalized retail electricity markets by developing and estimating a structural demand model using a novel dataset on electricity contract choices in Belgium. Our data allow us to dis-entangle different sources of inertia by using a rich combination of macromoments and micromoments. We find that consumers perceive contracts as differentiated and both limited awareness and switching costs hinder efficient choices...
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作者：Krasikov, Ilia; Lamba, Rohit; Mettral, Thomas
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper studies a canonical dynamic screening problem where the agent has Markovian private information and limited commit-ment and the principal and the agent have different discount fac-tors. Unequal discounting captures unequal access to capital markets. In comparison to standard models of dynamic mecha-nism design, the principal no longer finds it optimal to maximally back-load the agent's information rents: a new force of inter -temporal cost of incentive provision pushes toward front ...
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作者：Hauser, Daniel N.
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：I study how a firm manages its reputation by both investing in the quality of its product and censoring, hiding bad news from con -sumers. Without censorship, the threat of bad news provides strong incentives for investment. I highlight discontinuities in the firm's maximum equilibrium payoff that censorship creates. When censor-ship is inexpensive, the firm never invests and a patient firm's pay-offs approach the lowest possible. In contrast, when censorship is moderately expensive, there exi...
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作者：Temnyalov, Emil
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney
摘要：When are differential treatment policies-such as preferential treat-ment, affirmative action, and gender equity policies-justified by efficiency concerns? I propose a nonparametric assignment model where a policymaker assigns agents to different treatments or posi-tions to maximize total surplus, based on the agents' characteristics and noisy information about their types. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the agents' signal structures, which charac-terize whether surplus maximi...
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作者：Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L.; Sun, Yajie
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Tinbergen Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Navarra
摘要：An increase in quality shifts up the distribution of match utilities offered by firms and makes consumers pickier. The number of prod-ucts that consumers inspect does not necessarily increase in qual-ity. Higher search costs may lead to less quality investment, and the equilibrium price may decrease. If the equilibrium is inefficient , it is because of the inadequacy of quality investment. The market level of quality investment is excessive (insufficient) and consumers are too (little) picky f...
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作者：Arifovic, Jasmina; Hommes, Cars; Kopanyi-Peuker, Anita; Salle, Isabelle
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Bank of Canada; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Radboud University Nijmegen; University of Ottawa
摘要：We provide experimental evidence on coordination within large groups that could proxy the atomistic nature of real-world mar-kets. We use a bank run game where the two pure-strategy equilib-ria can be ranked by payoff and risk dominance and a sequence of public announcements introduces stochastic sunspot equilibria. We find systematic group size effects that theory fails to predict. When the payoff-dominant strategy is risky enough, the behavior of small groups is uninformative of the behavior...
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作者：Roger, Guillaume; Julien, Benoit
作者单位：Monash University
摘要：Principals seek to trade with homogeneous agents by posting incen-tive contracts, which direct their search. Search and moral hazard interact in equilibrium. If using transfers to compensate agents fail-ing to contract, the equilibrium allocation is always constrained -wel-fare-optimal in contrast to the one-to-one principal-agent problem. Search frictions thus correct that inefficiency because search requires internalizing the utility of agents. Incentives are weaker than in bilat-eral contra...
