Censorship and Reputation
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hauser, Daniel N.
署名单位：
Aalto University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20200266
发表日期：
2023
页码：
497-528
关键词：
摘要：
I study how a firm manages its reputation by both investing in the quality of its product and censoring, hiding bad news from con -sumers. Without censorship, the threat of bad news provides strong incentives for investment. I highlight discontinuities in the firm's maximum equilibrium payoff that censorship creates. When censor-ship is inexpensive, the firm never invests and a patient firm's pay-offs approach the lowest possible. In contrast, when censorship is moderately expensive, there exist equilibria where product quality is persistently high and payoffs approach the first-best, which can exceed the maximum equilibrium payoff if it was unable to censor.
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