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作者：Ater, Itai; Rigbi, Oren
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We study the effects of a price transparency regulation in Israeli supermarkets. Using price data collected before and after the regu-lation and a difference-in-difference research design, we show that price levels and price dispersion declined significantly after the reg-ulation. Chains also began setting identical prices in all stores. We use Robert and Stahl (1993) to interpret our findings, showing that low-priced chains extensively used price advertising after prices became transparent. T...
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作者：Budish, Eric; Bhave, Aditya
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Economists have long been puzzled by event-ticket underpricing: underpricing reduces revenue for the performer and encourages socially wasteful rent-seeking by ticket brokers. What about using an auction? This paper studies the introduction of auctions into this market by Ticketmaster in the mid-2000s. By combining primary-market auction data from Ticketmaster with secondary-market resale value data from eBay, we show that Ticketmaster's auctions worked : they substantially improved price disc...
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作者：Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents' information structure, requires (i) indi-vidual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the p...
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作者：Cosaert, Sam; Verheyden, Bertrand; Theloudis, Alexandros
作者单位：University of Antwerp; Tilburg University
摘要：Spending time with a spouse is a major gain from marriage. We extend the classical collective model of the household to allow for togetherness between spouses. Togetherness takes the form of joint leisure and joint care for children. Using revealed preference conditions and Dutch data over the years 2009-2012, we find that households are willing to pay euro 1.20 per hour-10 percent of the average wage-to convert private leisure to joint leisure and euro 2.10 per hour to convert private childca...
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作者：Kim, Jeongbin
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：This paper studies the effects of time preferences on cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game experiment. Subjects play repeated games in the lab, all decisions at once, but stage game payoffs are paid over an extended period of time. Changing the time window of stage game payoffs (weekly or monthly) varies discount factors, and a delay for the first-stage game payoffs eliminates/weakens present bias. First, subjects with weekly payments cooperate more than subjects with ...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico; Nasr, Nikrooz
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Florence
摘要：We study mix-and-match compatibility choices of firms selling com-plementary products in a dynamic setting. Contrary to what hap-pens in a static setting where symmetric firms choose compatibility (Matutes and Regibeau 1988 ), when switching costs are high and firms make price discrimination based on past purchases, symmet-ric firms choose incompatibility to soften future competition if the discount factor is large, which harms consumers. Interoperability increases consumer surplus at least fo...
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作者：Merlino, Luca P.; Pin, Paolo; Tabasso, Nicole
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; University of Antwerp; University of Siena; Bocconi University; University of Surrey
摘要：We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Communication intensity in itself is irrelevant for relative rumor prevalence, and the effect of homophily depends on the exact verification process and equilibrium verification rates. Our model highlights that successful policies in the f...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：This paper studies optimal contest design in contests with noisy per-formance. Here, contest design is a team moral hazard problem that endogenizes the assignment rule that maps performance profiles into winning probabilities. The optimal design features endogenous stan-dards for eligibility, and the number of prizes that are awarded may be stochastic. Generally, one group of agents is identified as first claim-ants of prizes, contingent on performance exceeding a threshold of excellence. Howe...
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作者：Lorecchio, Caio; Monte, Daniel
作者单位：University of Barcelona; Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Turin
摘要：An information designer wishes to persuade agents to invest in a project of unknown quality. To do so, she must induce investment and collect feedback from these investments. Motivated by data reg-ulations and simplicity concerns, our designer faces communica-tion constraints. These constraints hinder her without benefiting the agents: they impose an upper bound on the induced belief spread, limiting persuasion. Nevertheless, two-rating systems (direct recom-mendations) are the optimal design ...
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作者：Kubitz, Greg
作者单位：Queensland University of Technology (QUT)
摘要：In perfectly discriminating contests with private information , low-ability contestants prefer to appear strong, while high-ability contestants prefer to appear weak. In a two-stage contest , this leads to a unique symmetric equilibrium with partial pooling in the first stage. A higher output in the first contest leads to a weakly higher belief about the contestant's ability entering the second contest. We characterize this unique equilibrium when cost of effort is linear and show how the priz...
