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作者：Guo, Liang
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We revisit the interpretation of the anchoring effect as evidence for nonexisting or arbitrary preferences. A theory of endogenous information acquisition ( i.e. , deliberation) is developed to rationalize the causal dependence of economic valuations on arbitrary anchor numbers. We identify theory-driven moderators to reconcile seemingly discrepant findings among original and follow-up anchoring experiments. We demonstrate in a meta-analysis that the anchoring effect may be systematically mode...
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作者：Calford, Evan M.; Cason, Timothy N.
作者单位：Australian National University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：Contributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events , others who are better at extracting i...
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作者：Sampson, Thomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Global value chains create opportunities for North -South technology diffusion. This paper studies technology transfer in value chains when contracts are incomplete and input production technologies are imperfectly excludable. It introduces a new taxonomy of value chains based on whether the headquarters firm benefits from imitation of its supplier's technology. In inclusive value chains , where imitation is beneficial , the headquarters firm promotes technology diffusion. But in exclusive val...
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作者：Kibris, Ozgur; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Suleymanov, Elchin
作者单位：Sabanci University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We provide two nested models of random reference -dependent choice in which the reference point is endogenously determined by random processes. Random choice behavior is due to random reference points, even though, from the decision -maker's viewpoint, choices are deterministic. Through a revealed preference exercise, we establish when and how one can identify the reference -dependent preferences and the random reference rule from observed choice data. We also present behavioral postulates tha...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Fershtman, Daniel; Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; Emory University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We consider a decision-maker sequentially choosing among alternatives when periodic payoffs depend on both chosen and unchosen alternatives in that period. We show that when flow payoffs are the sum or product of payoffs from chosen and unchosen alternatives, the optimal policy is an index policy. We characterize key properties of the optimal dynamics and present an algorithm for computing the indices explicitly. Furthermore, we use the results to generalize Weitzman's ( 1979 ) classic Pandora...
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作者：Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Edinburgh
摘要：Two debaters address an audience by sequentially choosing their information strategies. We compare the setting where the second mover reveals additional information (constructive argumentation) with the setting where the second mover obfuscates the first mover's information (toxic argumentation). We reframe both settings as constrained optimization of the first mover. We show that when the preferences are zero-sum or risk-neutral, constructive debates reveal the state, while toxic debates are ...
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作者：Iossa, Elisabetta; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie m.; Rey, Patrick
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Melbourne; Duke University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimal...
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作者：Lambrecht, Marco; Proto, Eugenio; Rustichini, Aldo; Sofianos, Andis
作者单位：Hanken School of Economics; Universitetet i Stavanger; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Glasgow; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Durham University
摘要：How does information about players' intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, , based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, , does not provide useful predictions. We experimentally show that, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, disclosure hampers cooperation: higher-intelligence players trust their partners less when playing against someone of lower ability. Similarly, , in the Battle of Sexes with low payoff inequality, , disclosure disrupts coordination, , as higher-intelli...
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作者：Wang, Tao; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Capital University of Economics & Business; Durham University
摘要：We show that a probability distribution likelihood ratio dominates another distribution if and only if, for every weighted utility function, the former is preferred over the latter. Likewise, a probability distribution hazard rate (or reverse hazard rate) dominates another distribution if and only if, the former is preferred by every optimistic (or pessimistic) decision maker. (JEL D11, D83)
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作者：He, Simin; Wu, Jiabin; Zhang, Hanzhe; Zhu, Xun
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oregon; Michigan State University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We experimentally examine the Becker-Shapley-Shubik two-sided matching model. In the experiment, the aggregate outcomes of matching and surplus are affected by whether equal split is in the core and whether efficient matching is assortative; the canonical cooperative theory predicts no effect. In markets with an equal number of participants on both sides, individual payoffs cannot be explained by existing refinements of the core, but are consistent with our noncooperative model's predictions. ...
