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作者：Agranov, Marina; Eraslan, Hulya; Tergiman, Chloe
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Osaka; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：In bargaining environments with stochastic future surplus, failing to delay agreement can be inefficient when the expected future surplus is sufficiently high. Theoretically, such inefficiencies never arise under unanimity rule but can arise under majority rule. Using a laboratory experiment, we find support for these predictions, both when the unanimity rule is predicted to be more efficient and when there should be no difference between the two rules. We also find large point prediction devi...
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作者：Barrios, John m.; Wollmann, Thomas g.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Antitrust authorities search public documents to discover anticompetitive mergers. Thus, investor disclosures may alert them to deals that would otherwise go undetected, creating disincentives for managers to divulge certain transactions. We study this behavior in publicly traded US companies. First, we employ a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of mandatory disclosures. We find that releasing information to investors poses antitrust risk. Second, we introduce a method f...
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作者：Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Lausanne
摘要：We study secure survey designs in organizational settings where fear of retaliation makes it hard to elicit truth. Theory predicts that ( i ) randomized-response techniques offer no improvement because they are strategically equivalent to direct elicitation, ( ii ) exogenously distorting survey responses ( hard garbling) can improve information transmission, and ( iii ) the impact of survey design on reporting can be estimated in equilibrium. Laboratory experiments confirm that hard garbling o...
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作者：Laferriere, Vincent; Montez, Joao; Roux, Catherine; Thoni, Christian
作者单位：University of Lausanne; University of Lausanne; University of Basel
摘要：We study experimentally the effect of multigame contact on cooperation, with each subject playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if each of the two games is played with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, multigame contact does not increase overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acti...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Magnani, Jacopo
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
摘要：In vertically differentiated matching markets with private information, agents face an acceptance curse: being accepted as a partner conveys bad news. We experimentally investigate whether individuals anticipate the acceptance curse in such an environment. We test the effect of an exogenous change in reservation values, making some types more selective and inducing significant changes in the posterior distribution of match qualities. Consistent with limited strategic sophistication, subjects d...
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作者：Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique; Morales, Antonio J.; Qi, Shi
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of East Anglia; European University of Madrid; Universidad de Malaga; William & Mary
摘要：Level-k models often assume that individuals employ a fixed depth of reasoning across different games. We study this assumption by having subjects make choices in five classes of games chosen to identify inconsistent depth of reasoning. We demonstrate that depth of reasoning is pervasively inconsistent, changing both within and between classes of games. We show that this cannot easily be explained by factors such as subject confusion, changing beliefs about others' depth of reasoning, stochast...
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作者：Ide, Enrique
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：I explain why current success can undermine an organization's ability to innovate. I consider a standard bandit problem between a safe and a risky arm with two modifications. First, a principal allocates resources. Second, an agent must install the risky arm, which is not contractible. If the principal cannot commit to a resource policy, a dual moral hazard problem emerges: The agent's pay must be tied to the risky arm's success to encourage installation, inducing the principal to stop experim...
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作者：Gill, David; Rosokha, Yaroslav
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ( IRPD ) . To do so, , we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding behavior and learning in the IRPD. Beliefs strongly predict cooperation, , beliefs respond to the return to cooperation, , most subjects choose strategies that perform well given their beliefs, , and beli...
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作者：Huet-Vaughn, Emiliano; McClure, Ethan M. L.; Serrato, Juan Carlos Suarez
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Pomona College; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：Individuals face nonlinear incentives in myriad situations. We test a fundamental assumption in such settings: that individuals display stable preferences when facing linear and nonlinear incentives. We use a laboratory experiment to characterize how revealed preferences are affected by changes in the budget set environment. Choices under kinked budgets exhibit the same very high levels of internally consistent behavior as they do under linear budgets. However, for about half the subjects, cho...
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作者：Demuynck, Thomas; Staner, Clement
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We develop a revealed preference test for the Choquet expected utility model with ambiguity aversion, which does not rely on specific functional form assumptions on the utility index. It is computationally efficient if the number of states is not too large, even for a large number of observations. This is a nice feature compared to other existing revealed preference tests for decision models with ambiguity. We illustrate the usefulness of our results by implementing our test on two experimenta...
