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作者：Amir, R; Grilo, I
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We reconsider Stackelberg's classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of endogenous timing for two-player games. For quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions, directly on the demand and cost functions, yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play. While our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former, they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions. No extraneous ...
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作者：Nakanishi, N
作者单位：Kobe University
摘要：It is well known in international trade that a unique Nash equilibrium of a static quota game is no-trade and the Rodriguez-Tower alternating retaliation process yields the same outcome. Yet, they fail to capture the notion of retaliation appropriately. Using the framework of the theory of social situation, we construct a model of the quota retaliation as an individual contingent threats situation. In a static, non-cooperative setting, we show that every solution, called a stable standard of b...
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作者：Wit, J
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper describes the experimental results of a dynamic voting game. Subjects are induced with common preferences, but have asymmetric and incomplete information about the payoff-generating behavior of two available proposals. The election process serves as a mechanism to gather the dispersed information. It is shown that subjects are more effective in coordinating their decisions to a socially optimal equilibrium when they get more experienced. The way they succeed in doing this is by payi...
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作者：Hopkins, E
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：Fictitious play and stimulus-response/reinforcement learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behavior can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic belongs to the same class of simply defined dynamic as do several formulations of evolutionary dynamics. We obtain sufficient conditions for convergence and divergence which are valid fo...
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作者：Hamiache, G
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：The aim of this article is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game is defined and the value has to verify a consistency axiom. The generalization proposed here is different from the Myerson value, and it coincides with the Shapley value in the case of full communica...
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作者：McLennan, A; Park, IU
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Bristol
摘要：The maximal generic number of Nash equilibria for two person games in which the two agents each have four pure strategies is shown to be 15. In contrast to Keiding (1997), Games Econ. Behav. 21, 148-160, who arrives at this result by referring to the enumeration of Grunbaum and Sreedharan (1967), J. Combin. Theory 2, 437-465, our argument is based on a collection of lemmas that constrain the set of equilibria. Several of these pertain to any common number d of pure strategies for the two agent...
