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作者：Bossert, W; Brams, SJ; Kilgour, DM
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; New York University; Wilfrid Laurier University
摘要：It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, over one round or n rounds. Representative solution concepts (Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium; two notions of core) are compared, and little agreement is found among them. Although it might be desirable to subsume these different solut...
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作者：Volij, O
作者单位：Iowa State University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Juang, WT
作者单位：Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：This paper studies rule evolution and its effect on selection between strict equilibria. Two rules arc investigated; the myopic best response and naive imitation. If agents cannot change rules, equilibrium selection is determined by the relative frequency of agents using the two rules. When agents can only change rules through mutation, the efficient equilibrium weakly dominates the risk-dominant one. If agents can change rules by updating, then the efficient equilibrium strictly dominates the...
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作者：Berninghaus, SK; Ehrhart, KM; Keser, C
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium, We examine how much local interaction structures affect players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods. Second, when players are allocated around a circle, the neighborhood size has, in t...
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作者：Cooper, DJ; Stockman, CK
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Over the last twenty years, experimental economists have identified a wide variety of games in which subjects display other-regarding behavior in violation of standard game theoretic predictions. The two primary approaches to explaining this behavior can be characterized as the fairness hypothesis and the learning hypothesis. Both hypotheses provide an adequate explanation of behavior in existing experiments, but the two approaches rely on very different interpretations of the factors underlyi...
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作者：Faulí-Oller, R; Sandonís, J
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; University of Basque Country
摘要：In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalt...
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作者：Andreoni, J; Brown, PM; Vesterlund, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Auckland; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We explore three two-person public goods games with similar equilibrium predictions, but with different rules of the game, different payoff possibilities, and, as we show, different choices by subjects. Comparisons among games allow inferences of what may or may not determine when the equilibrium prediction is a good approximation of actual behavior. We find that the equilibrium prediction can fail even when incentives off the equilibrium enforce it. Our result suggests that the selfish predic...
