What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Andreoni, J; Brown, PM; Vesterlund, L
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Auckland; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.2001.0904
发表日期：
2002
页码：
1-24
关键词：
摘要：
We explore three two-person public goods games with similar equilibrium predictions, but with different rules of the game, different payoff possibilities, and, as we show, different choices by subjects. Comparisons among games allow inferences of what may or may not determine when the equilibrium prediction is a good approximation of actual behavior. We find that the equilibrium prediction can fail even when incentives off the equilibrium enforce it. Our result suggests that the selfish prediction is prone to deviations when the equilibrium results in unequal distributions of payoffs, and there are alternative outcomes that increase both equality and the payoff of the disadvantaged party. Furthermore, fairness is a function of more than just the final allocations to subjects; it depends on the actions not chosen as well as those that are. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).