Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Juang, WT
署名单位：
Academia Sinica - Taiwan
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.2001.0894
发表日期：
2002
页码：
71-90
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies rule evolution and its effect on selection between strict equilibria. Two rules arc investigated; the myopic best response and naive imitation. If agents cannot change rules, equilibrium selection is determined by the relative frequency of agents using the two rules. When agents can only change rules through mutation, the efficient equilibrium weakly dominates the risk-dominant one. If agents can change rules by updating, then the efficient equilibrium strictly dominates the risk-dominant one. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).