-
作者：Yildiz, M
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Given any two-person economy, consider an alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the proposers offer prices, and the responders either choose the amount of trade at the offered prices or reject the offer. We provide conditions under which the outcomes of all subgame-perfect equilibria converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (the price and the allocation) as the discount rates approach 1. Therefore, price-taking behavior can be achieved with only two agents. (C) 2003 El...
-
作者：Espinosa, MP; Macho-Stadler, I
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Basque Country
摘要：We analyze the formation of competing partnerships as a sequential game with moral hazard within coalitions. In a linear Cournot model, we show that when moral hazard is very severe, no partnerships will form. However, when moral hazard is not too severe, the coalition structure may be more concentrated than it is in the absence of moral hazard. Concerning industry profits, in the absence of moral hazard too many coalitions are formed in equilibrium as compared to the efficient outcome, but mo...
-
作者：Amir, R; Evstigneev, I; Wooders, J
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Arizona
摘要：This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We esta...
-
作者：Echenique, F; Sabarwal, T
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter increases, some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient condition such that at a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. We also adapt a standard algorithm to compute a minimal such newer parameter value and apply this algorithm to a game of network externalities. Our results are independent of a theory of equilibrium selection and a...
-
作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L; Young, P
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Ginsburgh, V; Zang, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We discuss a game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the joint income from the sale of passes among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered, the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
-
作者：Gale, D; Kariv, S
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We extend the standard model of social learning in two ways. First, we introduce a social network and assume that agents can only observe the actions of agents to whom they are connected by this network. Secondly, we allow agents to choose a different action at each date. If the network satisfies a connectedness assumption, the initial diversity resulting from diverse private information is eventually replaced by uniformity of actions, though not necessarily of beliefs, in finite time with pro...
-
作者：Blume, LE
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Recent advances in evolutionary game theory have introduced noise into decisionmaking to select in favor of certain equilibria in coordination games. Noisy decisionmaking is justified on bounded rationality grounds, and consequently the sources of noise are left unmodelled. This methodological approach can only be successful if the results do not depend too much on the nature of the noise process. This paper investigates invariance to noise of these results, both for the random matching paradi...
-
作者：Kittsteiner, T
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of London; University College London
摘要：In a symmetric independent private values setting a double auction dissolves a partnership efficiently. This well-known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations and forced participation. However, if participation is voluntary agents might prefer to prevent the dissolution by nonparticipation. This is due to the fact that bidders simultaneously suffer from a winners' and a losers' curse which they are unable to correct for by decreasing or increasing their bids. Even thoug...
-
作者：Napel, S
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：Two agents recurrently play a 2 x 2 version of the ultimatum game. Each player sticks to his past action if it was satisfactory relative to an endogenous aspiration level and otherwise abandons it with positive probability. This type of satisficing behavior is shown to yield efficiency in the limit. It does not favor a specific distribution of surplus and can give an explanation for the incidence of equitable offers in practice. Numerical investigations link a player's character as captured by...
