The museum pass game and its value
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ginsburgh, V; Zang, I
署名单位：
Tel Aviv University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00013-7
发表日期：
2003
页码：
322-325
关键词：
摘要：
We discuss a game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the joint income from the sale of passes among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered, the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.