Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kittsteiner, T
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00021-6
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 54-76
• 关键词: Double auction; Partnership dissolution; interdependent valuations

摘要

In a symmetric independent private values setting a double auction dissolves a partnership efficiently. This well-known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations and forced participation. However, if participation is voluntary agents might prefer to prevent the dissolution by nonparticipation. This is due to the fact that bidders simultaneously suffer from a winners' and a losers' curse which they are unable to correct for by decreasing or increasing their bids. Even though the double auction is not incentive efficient, gains from trade can be realized and the auction can be implemented without knowledge about the specifications of the model. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.