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作者：Gneezy, U; Haruvy, E; Roth, AE
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Chicago; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Harvard University
摘要：We study a reverse ultimatum game, in which proposers have multiple chances to offer responders a division of some fixed pie. The game ends if the responder accepts an offer, or if, following a rejection, the proposer decides not to make a better offer. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium gives the proposer the minimum possible payoff. Nevertheless, the experimental results are not too different from those of the standard ultimatum game, although proposers generally receive slightly less th...
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作者：Hart, S; Mas-Colell, A
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：\Regret-based dynamics have been introduced and studied in the context of discrete-time repeated play. Here we carry out the corresponding analysis in continuous time. We observe that, in contrast to (smooth) fictitious play or to evolutionary models, the appropriate state space for this analysis is the space of distributions on the product of the players' pure action spaces (rather than the product of their mixed action spaces). We obtain relatively simple proofs for some results known in the...
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作者：Aumann, RJ
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The Presidential Address at the First International Congress of the Game Theory Society, held in Bilbao, Spain, in July of 2000. The address contains a discussion of the Congress, of the functions and activities of the Society, of the Logo of the Society, of past accomplishments of the discipline, and of some future directions for research. The address is preceded by an introduction by David Kreps. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Abreu, D; Sethi, R
作者单位：Columbia University; Princeton University
摘要：A large and growing literature on reputation in games builds on the insight that the possibility of one or more players being boundedly rational can have significant effects on equilibrium behavior. This literature leaves unexplained the presence of behavioral players in the first place, as well as the particular forms of irrationality assumed and the population shares of the various types. In this paper we endogenize departures from rationality on the basis of an evolutionary stability criter...
