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作者：Thomson, W
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We construct simple games implementing in Nash equilibria several solutions to the problem of fair division. These solutions are the no-envy solution, which selects the allocations such that no agent would prefer someone else's bundle to his own. and several variants of this solution, Components of strategies can be interpreted as allocations, consumption bundles, permutations, points in simplices of dimensionalities equal to the number of goods or to the number of agents, and integers, We als...
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作者：McLean, R; Postlewaite, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economics. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Orzach, R; Tauman, Y
作者单位：Wayne State University; Tulane University; Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：Following Spence, this note provides an education signaling model to explain the phenomenon of gifted entrepreneurs who acquire less education than ordinary individuals. Two types of individuals, ordinary and gifted, are considered. Each one of them can either convince an investor to fund his enterprise or approach a competitive job market. The probability that an ordinary individual succeeds to establish a successful enterprise is smaller than that of a gifted individual irrespective of his e...
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作者：Hopkins, E; Posch, M
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Medical University of Vienna
摘要：This paper investigates the properties of the most common form of reinforcement learning (the basic model of Erev and Roth) [Amer. Econ. Rev. 88 (1998) 848-881]. Stochastic approximation theory has been used to analyse the local stability of fixed points under this learning process. However, as we show, when such points are on the boundary of the state space, for example, pure strategy equilibria, standard results from the theory of stochastic approximation do not apply. We offer what we belie...
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作者：Feinberg, Y
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A unified framework is developed for representation of, and reasoning about dynamic games. A game is described by the subjective knowledge of players at hypothetical situations-the epistemic game form. Subjective knowledge-termed confidence-allows us to replace objective reasoning about hypothetical events with reasoning about the confidence of hypothetical identities, i.e., the subjective reasoning of players in hypothetical situations. This leads to an endogenous definition for players* acti...
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作者：Mailath, GJ; Postlewaite, A; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within epsilon of a best response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect epsilon-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure e...
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作者：Samet, D; Safra, Z
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with respect to order-preserving transformations of utility. Shapley has constructed an ordinal, symmetric, efficient solution to three-player problems. Here, we extend Shapley's solution in two directions. First, we extend it to more than three players. Second, we show that this extension lends itself to the construction of a continuum of ordinal, symmetric, efficient solutions. The construction makes use of ordinal path-valued...
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作者：Hofbauer, J; Hopkins, E
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of London; University College London
摘要：We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2-person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (resealed) partnership games, also known as potential games. Lastly, mixed equilibria o...
