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作者：Dubey, P; Einy, E; Haimanko, O
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity requires that no voter has negative power, and at least one has positive power. Transfer requires that, when winning coalitions are enhanced in a game, the change in voting power depends only on the change in the game, i.e., on the set of new winning coalitions. The most crucial axiom is composition: the value of a player in a compound voting game is the product of his power in the relevant fir...
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作者：Asheim, GB; Perea, A
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Oslo
摘要：Within an epistemic model for two-player extensive games, we formalize the event that each player believes that his opponent chooses rationally at all information sets. Letting this event be common certain belief yields the concept of sequential rationalizability Adding preference for cautious behavior to this event likewise yields the concept of quasi-perfect rationalizability. These concepts are shown to (a) imply backward induction in generic perfect information games, and (b) be non-equili...
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作者：de Clippel, G
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory 13 (1984) 6996] extension of the lambda-transfer value to cooperative games with incomplete information focuses among other things on the strength of the incentive constraints at the solution for determining the power of coalitions. We construct an intuitive three-player game where the player whose only contribution is to partly release the two other players from the incentive constraints they face when they cooperat...
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作者：Karni, E; Postlewaite, A
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作者：Feinberg, Y
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The subjective framework is used to characterize the reasoning leading to an equilibrium refinement based on sequential rationality and Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. Equilibria based on sequential rationality require different reasoning on and off the equilibrium path for such solutions to emerge, or need arbitrary rules for reasoning depending on which game is played, We suggest a solution concept termed the reasonable solution based on maximization of confidence in rationality, equal tr...
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作者：Aramendía, M; Larrea, C; Ruiz, L
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：We explore a new concept of renegotiation proofness in the symmetric repeated Cournot model with several players. We show that this concept significantly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be sustained in equilibrium. In particular, the symmetric monopoly outcome cannot be sustained when the number of players is high enough (9 in the case of the linear demand function). When the number of players tends to infinity, (i) the collusive benefits that could be sustained are at most four times...
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作者：van den Brink, R; van der Laan, G
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：A value function for cooperative games with transferable utility is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of the payoffs over the players. An alternative type of solutions are share functions which assign to every player its share in the payoffs to be distributed. In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the players are organized into an a priori coalition structure being a finite partition of the player set. We introduce a general method for defining share f...
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作者：Hildenbrand, W; Kneip, A
作者单位：University of Bonn; Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz
摘要：It is shown how one can effectively use microdata in modelling the change over time in an aggregate (e.g. mean consumption expenditure) of a large and heterogeneous population. The starting point of our aggregation analysis is a specification of explanatory variables on the micro-level. Typically, some of these explanatory variables are observable and others are unobservable. Based on certain hypotheses on the evolution over time of the joint distributions across the population of these explan...
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作者：Hokari, T
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：Many solutions for TU-games coincide with the standard solution for the two-agent case. We study its weighted generalizations. In particular, we study whether max consistency is compatible with 2-weighted-standardness. We show that on the domain of all TU-games, efficiency, 2-weighted-standardness, and max consistency jointly imply equal treatment of equals. It follows from this result that on the same domain, the prenucleolus is the only single-valued solution satisfying efficiency, 2-weighte...
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作者：Duffy, J; Hopkins, E
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Edinburgh
摘要：Previous data from experiments on market entry games, N-player games where each player faces a choice between entering a market and staying out, appear inconsistent with either mixed or pure Nash equilibria. Here we show that, in this class of game, learning theory predicts sorting, that is, in the long run, agents play a pure strategy equilibrium with some agents permanently in the market, and some permanently out. We conduct experiments with a larger number of repetitions than in previous wo...
