Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ui, Takashi
• 署名单位: Yokohama National University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.018
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 361-369
• 关键词: global game; Quantal response equilibrium

摘要

This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.