Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chambers, CP; Hayashi, T
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 430-440
• 关键词: Harsanyi's theorem; Bayesian experts; subjective expected utility; state-dependent expected utility

摘要

Following Mongin [J. Econ. Theory 66 (1995) 313; J. Math. Econ. 29 (1998) 33 1], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.