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作者：Aliprantis, C. D.; Camera, G.; Puzzello, D.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky
摘要：We develop theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching processes. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different processes and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing a mapping between matching technologies and informational constraints. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Maastricht University
摘要：We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vale's [Roth, A.E., Vande Vate, J.H., 1990. Random paths to s...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one. Our result covers general stage games including those that fail a full-dimensionality condition that had been imposed in past work. It also provides a characterization of the limit set when the strategies are restricted in a way that endogenously makes the full-dimensionality condition fail, as in the strongly symmetric equi...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Segev, Ella; Talley, Eric
作者单位：Open University Israel; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Southern California; RAND Corporation
摘要：This paper explores the interdependence between market structure and an important class of cognitive biases. Starting with a familiar bilateral monopoly framework, we characterize the endogenous emergence of preference distortions during bargaining which cause negotiators to perceive their private valuations differently than they would outside the adversarial negotiation context. Using this model, we then demonstrate how a number of external interventions in the structure and/or organization o...
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作者：Germano, Fabrizio; Lugosi, Gabor
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We construct an Uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player plays according to it, mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The strategy requires very little in terms of information about the game, as players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs. Moreover, in a variant of the procedure, players need not know that there are other players in the game and that payoffs are determined through other players' acti...
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作者：Sun, Yeneng; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information. For such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence, and the blocking size of coalitions. Moreover, we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante Pareto, core and Walrasian allocations. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Karp, Larry; Lee, In Ho; Mason, Robin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Seoul National University (SNU); University of Southampton
摘要：We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent's payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents' strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Stanford University
摘要：We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty. (c) ...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf
作者单位：Maastricht University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We consider socially structured transferable utility games. For every coalition the relative strength of a player is measured by a power function. The socially stable core consists of the socially and economically stable payoff vectors. It is non-empty if the game itself is socially stable. The socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core. Generically, it consists of a finite number of payoff vectors. Convex TU-games have a non-empty socially stable core, irrespective ...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Duggan, John; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper formulates and analyzes a general model of elections in which candidates receive private signals about voters' preferences prior to committing to political platforms. We fully characterize the unique pure-strategy equilibrium: After receiving her signal, each candidate locates at the median of the distribution of the median voter's location, conditional on the other candidate receiving the same signal. Sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium are provided...
