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作者：Agastya, Murali; Menezes, Ham; Sengupta, Kunal
作者单位：University of Sydney; University of Queensland
摘要：Rarely, if ever. do parties contemplating a joint project commit resources without engaging in nonbindin- discussions about who does what. To examine the role of such discussions, we model the investment decision as a voluntary contribution game where each player is privately informed of her benefit from project's completion. Efficiency of every equilibrium of this game is improved when a prior stage of communication is allowed. Interestingly, this improvement can be achieved in simple equilib...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We model non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers, assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms' respective products and each firm has private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm's price reveals its respective product quality. We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the associated outputs...
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
作者单位：Middlebury College
摘要：Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders. even at considerable cost. To examine the implications of agents who punish, we simulate an environment populated with behavioral strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is allowed. We test ...
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作者：Benoit, Jean Pierre; Ok, Efe A.; Sanver, M. Rerazi
作者单位：New York University; Istanbul Bilgi University
摘要：We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (f...
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作者：Sanchez-Pages, Santiago; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Maastricht University
摘要：A recent experimental study of Cai and Wang [Cai, H., Wang, J., 2006. Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games. Games Econ. Behav. 95, 384-394] on strategic information transmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying, we show in a simple sender-receiver ...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We derive some simple formulas for limiting stationary distributions for models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy population games. As an application of these formulas, we investigate the robustness of equilibrium selection results to the assumption that the level of noise in agents' choice rules is vanishingly small. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sen, Debapriya; Tauman, Yair
作者单位：Toronto Metropolitan University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties are considered for a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly for both outside and incumbent innovators. It is shown that for any nondrastic innovation (a) the license is practically sold to all firms, ensuring full diffusion of the innovation, (b) consumers are better off, firms are worse off and the social welfare is improved, (c) the optimal licensing policy involves positive royalty for relatively significant innovations, (d) compar...
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作者：Cox, James C.; Friedman, Daniel; Gjerstad, Steven
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences in which my emotional state determines the marginal rate of substitution between my own and others' payoffs, and thus my subsequent choices. In turn, my emotional state responds to relative status and to the kindness or unkindness of others' choices. Structural estimations of this model with six existing data sets demonstrate that other-regarding preferences depend on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights. (c) 2006 Els...
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作者：Stoltz, Gilles; Lugosi, Gabor
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Hart and Schmeidler's extension of correlated equilibrium to games with infinite sets of strategies is studied. General properties of the set of correlated equilibria are described. It is shown that, just like for finite games, if all players play according to an appropriate regret-minimizing strategy then the empirical frequencies of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria whenever the strategy sets are convex and compact.(c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：A theorem on existence of mixed strategy equilibria in discontinuous zero-sum games is proved and applied to three models of elections. First, the existence theorem yields a mixed strategy equilibrium in the multidimensional spatial model of elections with three voters. A nine-voter example shows that a key condition of the existence theorem is violated for general finite numbers of voters and illustrates an obstacle to a general result. Second, the theorem provides a simple and self-contained...
