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作者：Montrucchio, Luigi; Scarsini, Marco
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin
摘要：We consider a game, called newsvendor game, where several retailers, who face a random demand, can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers. A game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit. We consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors. We prove in great generality results abo...
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作者：Cassar, Alessandra
作者单位：University of San Francisco
摘要：A laboratory experiment has been designed to study coordination and cooperation in games played on local, random and small-world networks. For the coordination game, the results revealed a tendency for coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in all three networks, but the frequency of payoff-dominant choices was significantly higher in small-world networks than in local and random networks. For the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation was hard to reach on all three networks, with avera...
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作者：Echenique, Federico
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents-which has positive implicatio...
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作者：Schotter, Andrew; Sopher, Barry
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; New York University
摘要：In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior...
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作者：Kirchkamp, Oliver; Nagel, Rosemarie
作者单位：University of St Andrews; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, may be negligible in the experiment. Naive imitation predicts more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones-regardless ...
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作者：Chang, Chih; Hu, Chcng-Cheng
作者单位：Southern Taiwan University of Science & Technology; National Tsing Hua University
摘要：The initiating points of the current paper are the axiomatic characterizations, in terms of consistency, of the equal allocation of nonseparable cost value (by Moulin), the Shapley value (by Hart and Mas-Colell), and the prenucleolus (by Orshan). The basic axioms are the same, but three different reduced games can be used to distinguish these three solutions. The main purpose of the paper is to illustrate that besides the definitions of reduced games are different, the axiom converse consisten...
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作者：Viossat, Yannick
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4 x 4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sotomayor, Marilda
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo
摘要：Flexible firms compete by means of wages in the Assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the Marriage market. Workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market. Examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the Marriage market (respectively, Assignment market) are not robust to the entrance of flexible (respectively, rigid) firms to this market. A new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core...
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作者：Andreoni, James; Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Columbia University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as the general predictions of the auction theory, by providing an effective means to control for risk aversion and other behavioral motives that were difficult to control for in previous experiments. Our experimental evidence prov...
