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作者：Izquierdo, Luis R.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Gotts, Nicholas M.; Polhill, J. Gary
作者单位：Universidad de Burgos; Universidad de Valladolid; James Hutton Institute
摘要：Reinforcement learners tend to repeat actions that led to satisfactory outcomes in the past, and avoid choices that resulted in unsatisfactory experiences. This behavior is one of the most widespread adaptation mechanisms in nature. In this paper we fully characterize the dynamics of one of the best known stochastic models of reinforcement learning [Bush, R., Mosteller, F., 1955. Stochastic Models of Learning. Wiley & Sons, New York] for 2-player 2-strategy games. We also provide some extensio...
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作者：John, Morgan; Vardy, Felix
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the value of commitment in sequential contests when the follower faces small costs to observe the leader's effort. We show that the value of commitment vanishes entirely in this class of games. By contrast, in sequential tournaments-games where, at a cost, the follower can observe the effectiveness of the leader's effort-the value of commitment is preserved completely provided that the observation costs are sufficiently small. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division. (C) 2007 E...
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作者：Xu, Yongsheng; Yoshihara, Naoki
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Hitotsubashi University
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作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal-agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that, under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof even when type realizations are serially correlated. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, it is always optimal to partially screen the types by offering a menu of choices to the agent; and the distortion induced by the ...
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作者：Berger, Ulrich
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：Fictitious Play is the oldest and most studied learning process for games. Since the already classical result for zero-sum games, convergence of beliefs to the set of Nash equilibria has been established for several classes of games, including weighted potential games, supertroodular games with diminishing returns, and 3 x 3 supermodular games. Extending these results, we establish convergence of Continuous-time Fictitious Play for ordinal potential games and quasi-supermodular games with dimi...
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作者：Callandera, Steven; Wilkie, Simon
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Southern California
摘要：Despite a pervasive presence in politics, lying has not traditionally played a role in formal models of elections. In this paper we develop a model that allows candidates in the campaign stage to misrepresent their policy intentions if elected to office, and in which the willingness to lie varies across candidates. We find that candidates more willing to lie are favored, but that this advantage is limited by the electoral mechanism and to such an extent that more honest candidates win a signif...
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作者：Smith, Trenton G.; Tasnadi, Attila
作者单位：Washington State University; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical validity of our thesis with an indepth review and synthesis of the biomedical literature concerning the action of opiates in the mammalian brain and their effects on behavior. Our results lend credence to many of the unco...
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作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Steiner, Jakub
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We consider the effects of risk preferences in mixed-strategy equilibria of 2 x 2 games, provided such equilibria exist. We identify sufficient conditions under which the expected payoff in the mixed equilibrium increases or decreases with the degree of risk aversion. We find that (at least moderate degrees of) risk aversion will frequently be beneficial in mixed equilibria. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma
作者单位：University of Toyama; Tokyo Metropolitan University
摘要：We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson...
