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作者：Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Hierarchies of beliefs play a central role in game theory. In practice, they are modeled by type structures. This allows the analyst to describe hierarchies without explicitly specifying an infinite sequence of beliefs. The focus of this paper is type structures that contain all hierarchies of beliefs. Can the analyst identify these structures without explicit reference to hierarchies? That is, does there exist a test, defined on the type structure alone, so that the structure passes this test...
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作者：Jain, Kamal; Vazirani, Vijay V.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：We define a new class of markets, the Eisenberg-Gale markets. This class contains Fisher's linear market, markets from the resource allocation framework of Kelly [Kelly, F.P., 1997. Charging and rate control for elastic traffic. Europ. Transactions Telecommunications 8, 33-37], as well as numerous interesting new markets. We obtain combinatorial, strongly polynomial algorithms for several markets in this class. Our algorithms have a simple description as ascending price auctions. Our algorithm...
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作者：Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Moreno, Diego; Shitovitz, Benyamin
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Hitotsubashi University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
摘要：We show that when firms have incomplete information about the market demand and their costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we also find some sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are possible. (C) 2009 Else...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Sakai, Toyotaka
作者单位：Yokohama National University; Maastricht University; University of Bern
摘要：An allocation rule is securely implementable if it is strategy-proof and has no bad Nash equilibrium in its associated direct revelation game [Saijo, T., Sjostrom, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. Theoretical Econ. 2, 203-229. Original work published in RIETI Discussion Paper (03-E-019), 2003]. We study this implementability notion in allotment economies with single-peaked preferences [Sprumont, Y., 1991. The division problem with single-peaked preferences: A characterization of th...
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作者：Castillo, Marco; Petrie, Ragan
作者单位：George Mason University
摘要：Using a laboratory experiment, we find evidence consistent with statistical discrimination in a public good and group formation game. In the game, payoff relevant information is presented to subjects, thereby making it costly to discriminate when choosing group members. We find that behavior is correlated with race and people use Face to predict behavior, However, race only matters when information on behavior is absent. These results are further confirmed when incentives are in place to encou...
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作者：Borgs, Christian; Chayes, Jennifer; Immorlica, Nicole; Kalai, Adam Tauman; Mirrokni, Vahab; Papadimitriou, Christos
作者单位：Microsoft; Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The Folk Theorem for repeated games suggests that finding Nash equilibria in repeated games should be easier than in one-shot games. In contrast, we show that the problem of finding any Nash equilibrium for a three-player infinitely-repeated game is as hard as it is in two-player one-shot games. More specifically, for any two-player game, we give a simple construction of a three-player game whose Nash equilibria (even under repetition) correspond to those of the one-shot two-player game. Combi...
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作者：Alpern, Steve; Gal, Shmuel; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study a selection game between two committee members (the players). They interview candidates sequentially and have to decide, after each interview, whether to hire the candidate or to interview the next candidate. Each player can either accept or reject the candidate, and if he rejects the candidate while the other accepts her, he can cast a veto. The candidate is hired if accepted by at least one player and not vetoed. The total number of vetoes available for each player are fixed in adva...
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作者：Rode, Julian
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：The paper analyses the results of a Communication Game in a cooperative or a competitive context. In this game, decision makers face uncertainty about the consequences of their choice, but can rely on recommendations from advisors. Financial incentives between alternatives are not aligned for the two players, which produces an incentive to lie. While many advisors tell the truth against their monetary self-interest, the propensity to tell the truth is unaffected by the contextual variation. In...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：For a convex technology C we characterize cost sharing games where the Nash equilibrium demands maximize total surplus. Budget balance is possible if and only if C is polynomial of degree n - 1 or less. For general C, the residual* cost shares are balanced if at least one demand is null, a characteristic property. If the cost function is totally monotone, a null demand receives cash and total payments excess payment to efficient surplus is at most min{2/log n, l}. For power cost functions, C(a...
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作者：Kayi, Cagatay; Ramaekers, Eve
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Maastricht University
摘要：A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency requires to maximize total welfare. Fairness requires to treat equal agents equally. One must form a queue, set up monetary transfers to compensate agents having to wait, and not a priori arbitrarily exclude agents from positions. As one may not know agents waiting costs, they may have no incentive to reveal them. We identify the only rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency, equal t...
