An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Moulin, Herve
署名单位：
Rice University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.028
发表日期：
2010
页码：
107-131
关键词：
摘要：
For a convex technology C we characterize cost sharing games where the Nash equilibrium demands maximize total surplus. Budget balance is possible if and only if C is polynomial of degree n - 1 or less. For general C, the residual* cost shares are balanced if at least one demand is null, a characteristic property. If the cost function is totally monotone, a null demand receives cash and total payments excess payment to efficient surplus is at most min{2/log n, l}. For power cost functions, C(a) = a(p), p > 1, the ratio of budget imbalance to efficient surplus vanishes as 1/n(p-1). For analytic cost functions, the ratio converges to zero exponentially along a given sequence of users. All asymptotic properties are lost if the cost function is not smooth. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.