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作者：Anton, James J.; Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Duke University
摘要：In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format that allows for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty regarding scale economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the efficient allocations include split-award outcomes as well as sole-source outcomes (one active supplier). We examine the price performance and efficiency properties of split-award auctions under asymmetric information. In equilibrium, both award outcom...
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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：The relationship between Popper spaces (conditional probability spaces that satisfy some regularity conditions), lexicographic probability systems (LPS's), and nonstandard probability spaces (NPS's) is considered. If countable additivity is assumed, Popper spaces and a subclass of LPS's are equivalent; without the assumption Of Countable additivity, the equivalence no longer holds. If the state space is finite, LPS's are equivalent to NPS's. However, if the state space is infinite, NPS's are s...
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作者：Kranz, Sebastian
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：The article investigates social interaction among individuals who differ in their privately known motivation to comply with moral norms that are collectively rational in the sense that they maximize welfare given the distribution of moral motivation in the society. This yields tractable models of rule-consequentialism that can be tested with experimental data. The analysis focuses on two welfare principles: utilitarianism and complier optimality. The latter puts explicit welfare weight only on...
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作者：Kar, Anirban; Ray, Indrajit; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：University of Birmingham; Delhi School of Economics; University of Delhi; Brown University
摘要：We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. Thus, no mechanism that aims to understand a correlated distribution as the unique outcome of Nash equilibrium play ...
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作者：Tauman, Yair; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：Kyiv School of Economics; Kyiv Economics Institute (KEI); State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state five axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. In a solution every agent obtains a weighted average of his individually rational level and his marginal con...
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作者：Taylor, Curtis R.; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close, and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate. These findings suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g., through pre-election polls or expert forecasts) may undermine the democratic process. Our analysis reveals that if the distribution of political preferences ...
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作者：Kivetz, Gil; Tauman, Yair
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：The paper demonstrates that collusion in a private value first price auction is likely to occur even in a one shot interaction. The strategies of the colluding parties must be mixed since agreeing to submit a bid equal to the reservation price of the seller provides the incentive for that bidder to cheat on the designated winner. We deal with a complete information environment with arbitrary number of bidders. We characterize the sensible equilibrium outcome where the two bidders with the high...
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作者：Page, Frank H., Jr.; Wooders, Myrna
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Modeling club structures as bipartite directed networks, we formulate the problem of club formation with multiple memberships as a noncooperative game of network formation and identify conditions on network formation rules and players network payoffs sufficient to guarantee that the game has a potential function. Our sufficient conditions require that each player choose freely and unilaterally those clubs he joins and also his activities within those clubs (subject to feasibility constraints)....
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作者：Beigman, Eyal
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The strategic behavior of legislators depends on the information available before and during the legislation process. It is well established in the literature that interested parties such as voters and agenda setters can influence the outcomes of the process through strategic manipulation when they are sufficiently informed. When only partial information on the individual and collective preference is revealed the question of manipulability boils down to how Much information must be revealed be...
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作者：Voorneveld, Mark
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Tilburg University
摘要：In classical game theory, players have finitely many actions and evaluate outcomes of mixed strategies using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Allowing a larger, but countable, player set introduces phenomena that are impossible in finite games: Even if players have identical payoffs (no conflicts of interest), (I) this payoff may be minimized in dominant-strategy equilibria, and (2) games so alike that even the consequences of unilateral deviations are the same, may have disjoint se...
