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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Tjotta, Sigve; Torsvik, Gaute
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; University of Bergen
摘要：Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. For example, generosity depends on what the donor believes that the recipient expects to receive. We measure guilt aversion in three separate experiments: a dictator game experiment, a complete information trust game experiment, and a hidden action trust game experiment. In the experiments we inform donors about the beliefs of the matched recipients, while eliciting these beliefs so as to maximize recipie...
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作者：Anderson, Robert M.; Ellison, Glenn; Fudenberg, Drew
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called buyers and sellers: In the first period agents simultaneously choose between two identical possible locations; following this, the agents at each location play some sort of game with the other agents there. Buyers prefer locations with fewer other buyers and more sellers, and sellers have the reverse preferences. We study the set of possible equilibrium sizes for the two markets, and show that two markets of very different size...
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作者：Gossner, Olivier
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In games with incomplete information, more information to a player implies a broader strategy set for this player in the normal form game, hence more knowledge implies more ability. We prove that, conversely, given two normal form games G and G' such that players in a subset J of the set of players possess more strategies in G' than in G, there exist two games with incomplete information with normal forms G and G' such that players in J are more informed in the second than in the first. More a...
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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Mansour, Yishay
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the communication complexity of reaching a Nash equilibrium, i.e., on the number of bits that need to be transmitted, and thus also on the required number of steps. Specifically, we show lower bounds that are exponential in the number of players in each one of the following cases: (I) reaching a pure Nash e...
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作者：Bidner, Chris
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：The paper explores an environment in which agents are motivated to make unproductive investments with the sole aim of improving their matching opportunities. In contrast to existing work, I add frictions by allowing the investment to be imperfectly observed. The analysis allows for a deeper understanding of the trade-off inherent in related models: investments waste resources but facilitates more efficient matching patterns. I show that greater frictions i) do not always lead to inferior match...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of Vienna
摘要：Firms signal quality through prices even if the market structure is very competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality and each firm's product quality is private information (unknown to consumers and to other firms), there exist symmetric fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria where low quality firms randomize over an interval of prices and high quality firms charge high prices. Signaling requires that the ma...
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作者：Kalai, Adam Tauman; Kalai, Ehud; Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov
作者单位：Microsoft; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further benefit from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. This paper proposes a model of conditional commitments that unifies earlier models while avoiding circularities that often arise in such models. A commitment folk theorem shows that the potential of voluntary conditional commitments is essentially u...
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作者：Cominetti, Roberto; Melo, Emerson; Sorin, Sylvain
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Universidad de Chile; Universidad de Chile; Sorbonne Universite; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：A stochastic process that describes a payoff-based learning procedure and the associated adaptive behavior of players in a repeated game is considered. The process is shown to converge almost surely towards a stationary state which is characterized as an equilibrium for a related game. The analysis is based on techniques borrowed from the theory of stochastic algorithms and proceeds by studying an associated continuous dynamical system which represents the evolution of the players' evaluations...
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作者：Brandenburger, Adam
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Quantum games have been argued to differ from classical games by virtue of the quantum-mechanical phenomenon of entanglement. We formulate a baseline of classical correlation - which takes two forms according as signals added to the game are or are not required to be independent of chance moves in the underlying game. We show that independence is a necessary condition for the addition of quantum signals to have a different effect from the addition of classical signals. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. A...
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作者：Damianov, Damian S.; Oechssler, Joerg; Becker, Johannes Gerd
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of Texas System; University of Texas Rio Grande Valley; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform Price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Further...
