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作者：Andersson, T.; Svensson, L. -G.; Yang, Z.
作者单位：Lund University; Yokohama National University
摘要：A number of jobs are to be assigned to a greater number of workers. While having to abide by the law of minimum wages, firms must determine who should be assigned which job and at what Salary. In Such situations fair (envy-free) allocations usually fail to exist. To cope with this Situation, this paper proposes a new concept of fairness, called constrained fairness. Among the set of constrainedly fair allocations, the so-called constrainedly fair and minimal allocations are of particular inter...
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作者：Dhaene, Geert; Bouckaert, Jan
作者单位：KU Leuven; University of Antwerp
摘要：We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. Data on behavior and first- and second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject's behavior as a material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none. We found that in both games the behavior of about 80% of the first movers was a material best response, a reciprocity best response, or both. The remaining 20% of first mov...
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作者：Nikiforakis, Nikos
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in Public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give Subjects feedback is critical for the efficacy Of punishment. Providing subjects with information about the earnings Of their peers leads to significantly less cooperation and lower efficiency compared to a treatment in which Subjects receive information about the contributions of their peers. This is despite the fact that the feedback format does not ...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad
作者单位：Open University Israel
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作者：Chen, Yan; Takeuchi, Kan
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：The use of package auctions for complex resource allocation has been rapidly increasing in recent years. In this paper, we study two package auction mechanisms in a laboratory setting, a sealed bid Vickrey auction and an ascending version of Vickrey, the iBEA auction. Unlike the single-unit Vickrey auction, where bidders tend to overbid in the laboratory, most of our bidders either underbid or bid their true values. Furthermore, at the aggregate level, while the Vickrey auction generates signi...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Rosenberg, Dinah; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School; Universite Paris 13; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on the actual state of nature. These signals provide the players with partial information about the state of nature and may also serve as a means of correlation. Different information structures induce different outcomes. An information structure is better than another, with respect to a certain Solution concept, if the highest solution payof...
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作者：Shneyerov, Artyom; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game (DMBG) with two-sided private information bilateral bargaining. The model is a private information replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002). There are two kinds of frictions: time discounting and explicit search costs. A simple necessary and sufficient condition oil parameters for existence of a nontrivial equilibrium is obtained. This condition is the same regardless whether the information is private or not. In addition, it is shown...
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作者：Cao, Xiaoyong; Tian, Guoqiang
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：This paper characterizes the equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs in the independent private values environment. Bidders use cutoff strategies to decide whether they will participate in the auction. It is shown that, when bidders are homogeneous, there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, and further, there is no other equilibrium when valuation distribution functions are inelastic. When distribution functions are elastic at the symmetric equilibrium, there exis...
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作者：von Stengel, Bernhard; Zamir, Shmuel
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：A basic model of commitment is to convert a two-player game in strategic form to a leadership game with the same payoffs, where one player, the leader, commits to a strategy, to which the second player always chooses a best reply. This paper studies such leadership games for games with convex strategy sets. We apply them to mixed extensions of finite games, which we analyze completely, including nongeneric games. The main result is that leadership is advantageous in the sense that, as a set, t...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Karni, Edi; Levin, Dan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Johns Hopkins University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper reports the results Of a series of experiments designed to rest whether and to what extent individuals Succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of Tversky and Kahneman (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion of individuals who violate the conjunction principle is significantly lower than that repotted by Kahneman and Tversky. Moreover, when subjects are allowed to consult with other subjects, these proportions fall dramatically, particular...
