Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cao, Xiaoyong; Tian, Guoqiang
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of International Business & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 258-273
• 关键词: Private values; Participation costs; First price auctions; Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium

摘要

This paper characterizes the equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs in the independent private values environment. Bidders use cutoff strategies to decide whether they will participate in the auction. It is shown that, when bidders are homogeneous, there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, and further, there is no other equilibrium when valuation distribution functions are inelastic. When distribution functions are elastic at the symmetric equilibrium, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. Inelasticity/elasticity includes concavity/convexity of distribution functions as a special case. We find similar results when bidders are heterogeneous. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.