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作者：Rick, Scott; Weber, Roberto A.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Psychologists have long recognized two kinds of learning: one that is relatively shallow and domain-specific; and another that is deeper, producing generalizable insights that transfer across domains. The game theory literature has only recently considered this distinction, and the conditions that stimulate the latter kind of meaningful learning in games are still unclear. Three experiments demonstrate that one kind of meaningful learning - acquisition of iterated dominance - Occurs in the abs...
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作者：Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Kornhauser, Lewis A.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; New York University
摘要：In many, if not most, elections, several different seats must be filled, so that a group of candidates, or an assembly, is selected. Typically in these elections, voters cast their ballots on a seat-by-seat basis. We show that these seat-by-seat procedures are efficient only under extreme conditions. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Demange, Gabrielle
摘要：The paper investigates the formation of information sharing comm unities. The environment is characterized by the anonymity of the contributors and users, as on the Web. Furthermore information exchange is limited to simple recommendations. When preferences differ, it is argued that a Community may be worth forming because it facilitates the interpretation and understanding of the posted information. The admission rule within a community the quality of information, and the stability of multipl...
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作者：Huber, Juergen; Shubik, Martin; Sunder, Shyam
作者单位：Yale University; University of Innsbruck
摘要：We define and examine three minimal market games (sell-all, buy-sell, and double auction) in the laboratory relative to the predictions of theory. These closed exchange economies have some cash to facilitate transactions, and include feedback. The experiment reveals that (1) the competitive general equilibrium (CGE) and non-cooperative (NCE) models are reasonable anchors to locate most but not all the observed outcomes of the three market mechanisms; (2) outcomes tend to get closer to CGE pred...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Moulin, Herve
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：Several authors recently proposed an elegant construction to divide the minimal cost of connecting a given set of users to a source. This folk solution applies the Shapley value to the largest reduction of the cost matrix that does not affect the efficient cost. It is also obtained by the linear decomposition of the cost matrix in the canonical basis. Because it relies on the irreducible cost matrix, the folk solution ignores interpersonal differences in relevant connecting costs. We propose a...
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作者：Geanakoplos, John; Dubey, Pradeep
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Yale University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：The introduction and widespread use of credit cards increases trading efficiency but, by also increasing the velocity of money, it causes inflation, in the absence of monetary intervention. If the monetary authority attempts to restore pre-credit card price levels by reducing the money supply, it might have to sacrifice the efficiency gains. When there is default on credit cards, there is even more inflation, and less efficiency gains. The monetary authority might then have to accept less than...
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作者：De Sinopoli, Francesco; Pimienta, Carlos
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Verona
摘要：We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Schotter, Andrew
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Brown University
摘要：This paper presents experimental evidence that when individuals are about to make a given decision under risk, they are willing to pay for information on the likelihood that this decision is ex-post optimal, even if this information will not affect their decision. Our findings suggest that this demand for non-instrumental information is caused by what we refer to as a confidence effect: the desire to increase one's posterior belief by ruling out bad news, even when such news would have no effe...
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作者：Benhabib, Jess; Bisin, Alberto; Schotter, Andrew
作者单位：New York University
摘要：In this paper we elicit preferences for money-time pairs via experimental techniques. We estimate a general specification of discounting that nests exponential and hyperbolic discounting, as well as various forms of present bias, including quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We find that discount rates are high and decline with both delay and amount, as most of the previous literature. We also find clear evidence for present bias. When identifying the form of the present bias, little evidence for qu...
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作者：Hummel, Patrick
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I analyze mixed strategy equilibria in a Downsian model with two office-motivated candidates in which one candidate is endowed with a sufficiently large valence advantage that a voter might prefer this candidate even if the voter strictly prefers the other candidate's policies. There is a discrete one-dimensional policy space and the preferences of the median voter are uncertain. I show that there is a range of moderate policies with no gaps that are optimal for the advantaged candidate. There...
