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作者：Wichardt, Philipp C.
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper proposes a bounded rationality approach to model equilibrium play in games. It is based on the observation that decision makers often do not seem to fully distinguish between different but seemingly similar decisions and tend to treat such similar decisions in a standardised/habitual way. To capture this, each player's information partition is derived from a similarity grouping of decisions based on the local structure of the game equality of available actions and analogy of locally...
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作者：Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of York - UK
摘要：Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget. We show that this phenomenon can occur as an equilibrium of a non-cooperative bargaining game based on the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory ...
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作者：Hens, Thorsten; Vogt, Bodo
作者单位：Otto von Guericke University; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Zurich; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Using an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy as a basis, we argue that a monetary system can be more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. We show that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided every participant considers the feedback of his choice to the stationary equilibrium. If, however, the participants do not play stationary strategies and some participants notoriously refuse to accept money, then due to negative reciprocity their be...
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作者：Branas-Garza, Pablo; Cobo-Reyes, Ramon; Paz Espinosa, Maria; Jimenez, Natalia; Kovarik, Jaromir; Ponti, Giovanni
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; University of Granada; University of Basque Country
摘要：We report on a two-stage experiment in which (i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and (ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We observe that more socially integrated subjects are also more altruistic, as betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree are positively correlated with the level of giving, even after controlling for framing and social distance, which have been shown to significantly affect giv...
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作者：Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Cologne
摘要：We analyze the classic moral hazard problem with the additional assumption that agents are inequity averse. The presence of inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. When the concern for equity becomes more important, there is convergence towards linear sharing rules. The sufficient statistics result is violated. Depending on the environment, contracts may be either overdetermined, i.e. include non-informative performance measures, or incomplete, i.e. neglect informative per...
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作者：Wolpert, David H.
作者单位：National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA); NASA Ames Research Center
摘要：A major factor affecting a person's happiness is the gap between their income and their neighbors', independent of their own income. This effect is strongest when the neighbor has moderately higher income. In addition a person's lifetime happiness often follows a U shape. Previous models have explained subsets of these phenomena, typically assuming the person has limited ability to assess their own (hedonic) utility. Here I present a model that explains all the phenomena, without such assumpti...
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作者：Chone, Philippe; Linnemer, Laurent
摘要：This paper investigates the strategic effects of case preparation in litigation. Specifically, it shows how the pretrial efforts incurred by one party may alter its adversary's incentives to settle. We build a sequential game with one-sided asymmetric information where the informed party first decides to invest in case preparation, and the uninformed party then makes a settlement offer. Overinvestment, or bluff, always prevails in equilibrium: with positive probability, plaintiffs with weak ca...
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作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Netzer, Nick
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Zurich
摘要：We develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit-response learning dynamics in games, with arbitrary specification of revision opportunities. The result allows us to show convergence to the set of Nash equilibria in the class of best-response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games. We also Study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specification of revision opportuniti...
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作者：Fahrenberger, Theresa; Gersbach, Hans
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects including a first-period project that may have long-lasting impact. In the first period, a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting, only voting losers retain their voting rights...
