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作者：Hougaard, Jens Leth; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen
摘要：This paper considers the problem of maximizing social welfare subject to participation constraints. It is shown that for an income allocation method that maximizes a social welfare function there is a monotonic relationship between the incomes allocated to individual agents in a given coalition (with at least three members) and its participation constraint if and only if the aggregate income to that coalition is always maximized. An impossibility result demonstrates that there is no welfare ma...
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作者：Gill, David; Stone, Rebecca
作者单位：University of Southampton
摘要：We model the behavior of agents who care about receiving what they feel they deserve in a two-player rank-order tournament. Perceived entitlements are sensitive to how hard an agent has worked relative to her rival, and agents are loss averse around their meritocratically determined endogenous reference points. In a fair tournament sufficiently large desert concerns drive identical agents to push their effort levels apart in order to end up closer to their reference points on average. In an un...
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作者：Hortala-Vallve, Rafael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In Conflict Resolution situations where two parties with opposed preferences need to make a number of decisions simultaneously, we propose a simple mechanism that endows agents with a certain number of votes that can be distributed freely across issues. This mechanism allows parties to trade off their voting power across issues and extract gains from differences in the intensities of their preferences. The appealing properties of such a mechanism may be negated by strategic interactions among ...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito; Takagi, Yuki
作者单位：Harvard University; Stanford University
摘要：This paper investigates a jury decision when hung juries and retrials are possible. When jurors in subsequent trials know that previous trials resulted in hung juries, informative voting cannot be an equilibrium regardless of voting rules unless the probability that each juror receives the correct signal when the defendant is guilty is identical to the one when he is innocent. Thus, while Coughlan (2000) claims that mistrials facilitate informative voting, our result shows that such an asserti...
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作者：de Meza, David; Lockwood, Ben
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：This paper shows that when agents on both sides of the market are heterogeneous, varying in their costs of investment, ex ante investments by firms and workers (or buyers and sellers more generally) may be too high when followed by stochastic matching and bargaining over quasi-rents. The overinvestment is caused by the fact that low-cost agents, by investing more, can increase the value of their outside option and thus shift rent away from high-cost investors. Numerical simulations show that o...
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作者：Taylor, Curtis R.; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority, but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election. As the electorate size grows without bound, equilibrium outcome is completely determined by the individuals possessing the low...
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作者：Berg, Joyce E.; Dickhaut, John W.; Rietz, Thomas A.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Iowa; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：Researchers Vigorously debate the impact of incentives in preference reversal experiments. Do incentives alter behavior and generate economically consistent choices? Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) document inconsistencies (reversals) in revealed preference in gamble pairs across paired choice and individual pricing tasks. The observed pattern is inconsistent with stable underlying preferences expressed with simple errors. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973) and Grether and Plott (1979) introduce in...
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作者：Boros, Endre; Elbassioni, Khaled; Gurvich, Vladimir; Makino, Kazuhisa
作者单位：Max Planck Society; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Tokyo
摘要：To each game form an effectivity function (EFF) E-g is assigned. An EFF E is called formal (formal-minor) if E = E-g (respectively, E <= E-g) for a game form g. (i) An EFF is formal iff it is superadditive and monotone. (ii) An EFF is formal-minor iff it is weakly superadditive. Theorem (ii) looks more sophisticated, yet, it is simpler than Theorem (i) and instrumental in its proof. In addition, (it) has important applications in social choice, game, and even graph theories. Constructive proof...
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作者：Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or d...
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作者：Lee, Gea M.
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：In this paper, two firms play an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game, and each firm has an agent who produces the firm's output and holds private information about production costs. The colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents' information. We develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information. We show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optima...
