Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: An experimental analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dhaene, Geert; Bouckaert, Jan
• 署名单位: KU Leuven; University of Antwerp
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.009
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 289-303
• 关键词: Sequential reciprocity; Sequential prisoner's dilemma; Mini-ultimatum game

摘要

We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. Data on behavior and first- and second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject's behavior as a material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none. We found that in both games the behavior of about 80% of the first movers was a material best response, a reciprocity best response, or both. The remaining 20% of first movers almost always made choices that were too kind according to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's theory. Second-mover behavior, in both games, was in line with the predictions of the theory. We found first- and second-order beliefs to be unbiased in the sequential prisoner's dilemma, but biased in the mini-ultimatum game. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.