Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shneyerov, Artyom; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
• 署名单位: Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.005
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 748-762
• 关键词: Matching and bargaining; search frictions; two-sided incomplete information; Diamond's paradox

摘要

We study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game (DMBG) with two-sided private information bilateral bargaining. The model is a private information replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002). There are two kinds of frictions: time discounting and explicit search costs. A simple necessary and sufficient condition oil parameters for existence of a nontrivial equilibrium is obtained. This condition is the same regardless whether the information is private or not. In addition, it is shown that when the discount rate is Sufficiently small, the equilibrium is unique and has the property that every meeting results in trade. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.