A theory of hung juries and informative voting
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kojima, Fuhito; Takagi, Yuki
署名单位：
Harvard University; Stanford University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.003
发表日期：
2010
页码：
498-502
关键词：
摘要：
This paper investigates a jury decision when hung juries and retrials are possible. When jurors in subsequent trials know that previous trials resulted in hung juries, informative voting cannot be an equilibrium regardless of voting rules unless the probability that each juror receives the correct signal when the defendant is guilty is identical to the one when he is innocent. Thus, while Coughlan (2000) claims that mistrials facilitate informative voting, our result shows that such an assertion holds only in limited circumstances. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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