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作者：Chen, Yan; Takeuchi, Kan
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：The use of package auctions for complex resource allocation has been rapidly increasing in recent years. In this paper, we study two package auction mechanisms in a laboratory setting, a sealed bid Vickrey auction and an ascending version of Vickrey, the iBEA auction. Unlike the single-unit Vickrey auction, where bidders tend to overbid in the laboratory, most of our bidders either underbid or bid their true values. Furthermore, at the aggregate level, while the Vickrey auction generates signi...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Rosenberg, Dinah; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School; Universite Paris 13; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on the actual state of nature. These signals provide the players with partial information about the state of nature and may also serve as a means of correlation. Different information structures induce different outcomes. An information structure is better than another, with respect to a certain Solution concept, if the highest solution payof...
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作者：Shneyerov, Artyom; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game (DMBG) with two-sided private information bilateral bargaining. The model is a private information replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002). There are two kinds of frictions: time discounting and explicit search costs. A simple necessary and sufficient condition oil parameters for existence of a nontrivial equilibrium is obtained. This condition is the same regardless whether the information is private or not. In addition, it is shown...
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作者：Kalai, Adam Tauman; Kalai, Ehud; Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov
作者单位：Microsoft; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further benefit from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. This paper proposes a model of conditional commitments that unifies earlier models while avoiding circularities that often arise in such models. A commitment folk theorem shows that the potential of voluntary conditional commitments is essentially u...
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作者：Cominetti, Roberto; Melo, Emerson; Sorin, Sylvain
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Universidad de Chile; Universidad de Chile; Sorbonne Universite; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：A stochastic process that describes a payoff-based learning procedure and the associated adaptive behavior of players in a repeated game is considered. The process is shown to converge almost surely towards a stationary state which is characterized as an equilibrium for a related game. The analysis is based on techniques borrowed from the theory of stochastic algorithms and proceeds by studying an associated continuous dynamical system which represents the evolution of the players' evaluations...
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作者：Cao, Xiaoyong; Tian, Guoqiang
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：This paper characterizes the equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs in the independent private values environment. Bidders use cutoff strategies to decide whether they will participate in the auction. It is shown that, when bidders are homogeneous, there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, and further, there is no other equilibrium when valuation distribution functions are inelastic. When distribution functions are elastic at the symmetric equilibrium, there exis...
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作者：von Stengel, Bernhard; Zamir, Shmuel
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：A basic model of commitment is to convert a two-player game in strategic form to a leadership game with the same payoffs, where one player, the leader, commits to a strategy, to which the second player always chooses a best reply. This paper studies such leadership games for games with convex strategy sets. We apply them to mixed extensions of finite games, which we analyze completely, including nongeneric games. The main result is that leadership is advantageous in the sense that, as a set, t...
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作者：Brandenburger, Adam
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Quantum games have been argued to differ from classical games by virtue of the quantum-mechanical phenomenon of entanglement. We formulate a baseline of classical correlation - which takes two forms according as signals added to the game are or are not required to be independent of chance moves in the underlying game. We show that independence is a necessary condition for the addition of quantum signals to have a different effect from the addition of classical signals. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. A...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Karni, Edi; Levin, Dan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Johns Hopkins University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper reports the results Of a series of experiments designed to rest whether and to what extent individuals Succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of Tversky and Kahneman (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion of individuals who violate the conjunction principle is significantly lower than that repotted by Kahneman and Tversky. Moreover, when subjects are allowed to consult with other subjects, these proportions fall dramatically, particular...
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作者：Damianov, Damian S.; Oechssler, Joerg; Becker, Johannes Gerd
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of Texas System; University of Texas Rio Grande Valley; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform Price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Further...
