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作者：Alpern, Steve; Gal, Shmuel; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study a selection game between two committee members (the players). They interview candidates sequentially and have to decide, after each interview, whether to hire the candidate or to interview the next candidate. Each player can either accept or reject the candidate, and if he rejects the candidate while the other accepts her, he can cast a veto. The candidate is hired if accepted by at least one player and not vetoed. The total number of vetoes available for each player are fixed in adva...
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作者：Rode, Julian
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：The paper analyses the results of a Communication Game in a cooperative or a competitive context. In this game, decision makers face uncertainty about the consequences of their choice, but can rely on recommendations from advisors. Financial incentives between alternatives are not aligned for the two players, which produces an incentive to lie. While many advisors tell the truth against their monetary self-interest, the propensity to tell the truth is unaffected by the contextual variation. In...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：For a convex technology C we characterize cost sharing games where the Nash equilibrium demands maximize total surplus. Budget balance is possible if and only if C is polynomial of degree n - 1 or less. For general C, the residual* cost shares are balanced if at least one demand is null, a characteristic property. If the cost function is totally monotone, a null demand receives cash and total payments excess payment to efficient surplus is at most min{2/log n, l}. For power cost functions, C(a...
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作者：Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Cologne
摘要：We analyze the classic moral hazard problem with the additional assumption that agents are inequity averse. The presence of inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. When the concern for equity becomes more important, there is convergence towards linear sharing rules. The sufficient statistics result is violated. Depending on the environment, contracts may be either overdetermined, i.e. include non-informative performance measures, or incomplete, i.e. neglect informative per...
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作者：Wolpert, David H.
作者单位：National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA); NASA Ames Research Center
摘要：A major factor affecting a person's happiness is the gap between their income and their neighbors', independent of their own income. This effect is strongest when the neighbor has moderately higher income. In addition a person's lifetime happiness often follows a U shape. Previous models have explained subsets of these phenomena, typically assuming the person has limited ability to assess their own (hedonic) utility. Here I present a model that explains all the phenomena, without such assumpti...
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作者：Kayi, Cagatay; Ramaekers, Eve
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Maastricht University
摘要：A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency requires to maximize total welfare. Fairness requires to treat equal agents equally. One must form a queue, set up monetary transfers to compensate agents having to wait, and not a priori arbitrarily exclude agents from positions. As one may not know agents waiting costs, they may have no incentive to reveal them. We identify the only rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency, equal t...
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作者：Chone, Philippe; Linnemer, Laurent
摘要：This paper investigates the strategic effects of case preparation in litigation. Specifically, it shows how the pretrial efforts incurred by one party may alter its adversary's incentives to settle. We build a sequential game with one-sided asymmetric information where the informed party first decides to invest in case preparation, and the uninformed party then makes a settlement offer. Overinvestment, or bluff, always prevails in equilibrium: with positive probability, plaintiffs with weak ca...
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作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the...
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作者：Anton, James J.; Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Duke University
摘要：In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format that allows for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty regarding scale economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the efficient allocations include split-award outcomes as well as sole-source outcomes (one active supplier). We examine the price performance and efficiency properties of split-award auctions under asymmetric information. In equilibrium, both award outcom...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Netzer, Nick
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Zurich
摘要：We develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit-response learning dynamics in games, with arbitrary specification of revision opportunities. The result allows us to show convergence to the set of Nash equilibria in the class of best-response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games. We also Study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specification of revision opportuniti...
