A commitment folk theorem
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kalai, Adam Tauman; Kalai, Ehud; Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov
署名单位：
Microsoft; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.008
发表日期：
2010
页码：
127-137
关键词：
摘要：
Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further benefit from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. This paper proposes a model of conditional commitments that unifies earlier models while avoiding circularities that often arise in such models. A commitment folk theorem shows that the potential of voluntary conditional commitments is essentially unlimited. All feasible and individually rational payoffs of a two-person strategic game can be attained at the equilibria of one (universal) commitment game that uses simple commitment devices. The commitments are voluntary in the sense that each player maintains the option of playing the game without commitment, as originally defined. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.