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作者：Andersson, T.; Svensson, L. -G.; Yang, Z.
作者单位：Lund University; Yokohama National University
摘要：A number of jobs are to be assigned to a greater number of workers. While having to abide by the law of minimum wages, firms must determine who should be assigned which job and at what Salary. In Such situations fair (envy-free) allocations usually fail to exist. To cope with this Situation, this paper proposes a new concept of fairness, called constrained fairness. Among the set of constrainedly fair allocations, the so-called constrainedly fair and minimal allocations are of particular inter...
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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Tjotta, Sigve; Torsvik, Gaute
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; University of Bergen
摘要：Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. For example, generosity depends on what the donor believes that the recipient expects to receive. We measure guilt aversion in three separate experiments: a dictator game experiment, a complete information trust game experiment, and a hidden action trust game experiment. In the experiments we inform donors about the beliefs of the matched recipients, while eliciting these beliefs so as to maximize recipie...
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作者：Dhaene, Geert; Bouckaert, Jan
作者单位：KU Leuven; University of Antwerp
摘要：We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. Data on behavior and first- and second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject's behavior as a material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none. We found that in both games the behavior of about 80% of the first movers was a material best response, a reciprocity best response, or both. The remaining 20% of first mov...
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作者：Anderson, Robert M.; Ellison, Glenn; Fudenberg, Drew
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called buyers and sellers: In the first period agents simultaneously choose between two identical possible locations; following this, the agents at each location play some sort of game with the other agents there. Buyers prefer locations with fewer other buyers and more sellers, and sellers have the reverse preferences. We study the set of possible equilibrium sizes for the two markets, and show that two markets of very different size...
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作者：Gossner, Olivier
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In games with incomplete information, more information to a player implies a broader strategy set for this player in the normal form game, hence more knowledge implies more ability. We prove that, conversely, given two normal form games G and G' such that players in a subset J of the set of players possess more strategies in G' than in G, there exist two games with incomplete information with normal forms G and G' such that players in J are more informed in the second than in the first. More a...
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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Mansour, Yishay
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the communication complexity of reaching a Nash equilibrium, i.e., on the number of bits that need to be transmitted, and thus also on the required number of steps. Specifically, we show lower bounds that are exponential in the number of players in each one of the following cases: (I) reaching a pure Nash e...
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作者：Nikiforakis, Nikos
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in Public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give Subjects feedback is critical for the efficacy Of punishment. Providing subjects with information about the earnings Of their peers leads to significantly less cooperation and lower efficiency compared to a treatment in which Subjects receive information about the contributions of their peers. This is despite the fact that the feedback format does not ...
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作者：Bidner, Chris
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：The paper explores an environment in which agents are motivated to make unproductive investments with the sole aim of improving their matching opportunities. In contrast to existing work, I add frictions by allowing the investment to be imperfectly observed. The analysis allows for a deeper understanding of the trade-off inherent in related models: investments waste resources but facilitates more efficient matching patterns. I show that greater frictions i) do not always lead to inferior match...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad
作者单位：Open University Israel
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of Vienna
摘要：Firms signal quality through prices even if the market structure is very competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality and each firm's product quality is private information (unknown to consumers and to other firms), there exist symmetric fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria where low quality firms randomize over an interval of prices and high quality firms charge high prices. Signaling requires that the ma...
