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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：The relationship between Popper spaces (conditional probability spaces that satisfy some regularity conditions), lexicographic probability systems (LPS's), and nonstandard probability spaces (NPS's) is considered. If countable additivity is assumed, Popper spaces and a subclass of LPS's are equivalent; without the assumption Of Countable additivity, the equivalence no longer holds. If the state space is finite, LPS's are equivalent to NPS's. However, if the state space is infinite, NPS's are s...
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作者：Kranz, Sebastian
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：The article investigates social interaction among individuals who differ in their privately known motivation to comply with moral norms that are collectively rational in the sense that they maximize welfare given the distribution of moral motivation in the society. This yields tractable models of rule-consequentialism that can be tested with experimental data. The analysis focuses on two welfare principles: utilitarianism and complier optimality. The latter puts explicit welfare weight only on...
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作者：Fahrenberger, Theresa; Gersbach, Hans
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects including a first-period project that may have long-lasting impact. In the first period, a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting, only voting losers retain their voting rights...
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作者：Rick, Scott; Weber, Roberto A.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Psychologists have long recognized two kinds of learning: one that is relatively shallow and domain-specific; and another that is deeper, producing generalizable insights that transfer across domains. The game theory literature has only recently considered this distinction, and the conditions that stimulate the latter kind of meaningful learning in games are still unclear. Three experiments demonstrate that one kind of meaningful learning - acquisition of iterated dominance - Occurs in the abs...
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作者：Kar, Anirban; Ray, Indrajit; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：University of Birmingham; Delhi School of Economics; University of Delhi; Brown University
摘要：We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. Thus, no mechanism that aims to understand a correlated distribution as the unique outcome of Nash equilibrium play ...
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作者：Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Kornhauser, Lewis A.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; New York University
摘要：In many, if not most, elections, several different seats must be filled, so that a group of candidates, or an assembly, is selected. Typically in these elections, voters cast their ballots on a seat-by-seat basis. We show that these seat-by-seat procedures are efficient only under extreme conditions. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Tauman, Yair; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：Kyiv School of Economics; Kyiv Economics Institute (KEI); State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state five axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. In a solution every agent obtains a weighted average of his individually rational level and his marginal con...
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作者：Demange, Gabrielle
摘要：The paper investigates the formation of information sharing comm unities. The environment is characterized by the anonymity of the contributors and users, as on the Web. Furthermore information exchange is limited to simple recommendations. When preferences differ, it is argued that a Community may be worth forming because it facilitates the interpretation and understanding of the posted information. The admission rule within a community the quality of information, and the stability of multipl...
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作者：Huber, Juergen; Shubik, Martin; Sunder, Shyam
作者单位：Yale University; University of Innsbruck
摘要：We define and examine three minimal market games (sell-all, buy-sell, and double auction) in the laboratory relative to the predictions of theory. These closed exchange economies have some cash to facilitate transactions, and include feedback. The experiment reveals that (1) the competitive general equilibrium (CGE) and non-cooperative (NCE) models are reasonable anchors to locate most but not all the observed outcomes of the three market mechanisms; (2) outcomes tend to get closer to CGE pred...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Moulin, Herve
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：Several authors recently proposed an elegant construction to divide the minimal cost of connecting a given set of users to a source. This folk solution applies the Shapley value to the largest reduction of the cost matrix that does not affect the efficient cost. It is also obtained by the linear decomposition of the cost matrix in the canonical basis. Because it relies on the irreducible cost matrix, the folk solution ignores interpersonal differences in relevant connecting costs. We propose a...
