Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heller, Yuval
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 394-400
• 关键词: non-cooperative games; cheap-talk; correlated equilibrium; Strong equilibrium; Coalition-proof equilibrium; Fault-tolerant distributed computation

摘要

This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.