The logit-response dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Netzer, Nick
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 413-427
• 关键词: Learning in games; Logit-response dynamics; Best-response potential games

摘要

We develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit-response learning dynamics in games, with arbitrary specification of revision opportunities. The result allows us to show convergence to the set of Nash equilibria in the class of best-response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games. We also Study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specification of revision opportunities. Our techniques can be extended and applied to a wide class of learning dynamics in games, (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.