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作者：Bonanno, Giacomo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We investigate an extension of the notion of backward induction to dynamic games with imperfect information and provide a doxastic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2014), who also provided a doxastic characterization in terms of the notion of common belief of future rationality. The characterization we propose, although differently formulated, is conceptually the same as Perea's and so is the generalization o...
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作者：Sawa, Ryoji
作者单位：University of Aizu
摘要：This paper examines a dynamic process of unilateral and joint deviations of agents and the resulting stochastic evolution of social conventions. Our model unifies stochastic stability analysis in static settings, including normal form games, network formation games, and simple exchange economies, as stochastic stability analysis in a class of interactions in which agents unilaterally and jointly choose their strategies. We embed a static setting in a dynamic process; Over time agents revise th...
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作者：Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering and one's own preference. After describing two examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i) rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relat...
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作者：Houy, Nicolas; Zwicker, William S.
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Union College
摘要：Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the relationship between voting weight and some measure of the influence that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody this relati...
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作者：Trudeau, Christian
作者单位：University of Windsor
摘要：We consider an extension of minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems in which some agents do not need to be connected to the source, but might reduce the cost of others to do so. Even if the cost usually cannot be computed in polynomial time, we extend the characterization of the Kar solution (Kar, 2002) for classic mcst problems. It is obtained by adapting the Equal treatment property: if the cost of the edge between two agents changes, their cost shares are affected in the same manner if t...
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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Hanken School of Economics; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We offer a tractable model of tough negotiations and delayed agreement. The setting is an infinite horizon bilateral bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but uncommitted negotiators can make new commitments. The game's unique Markov Perfect equilibrium outcome takes the form of a war of attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If...
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作者：Britz, Volker; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the frequently studied rejector-becomes-proposer protocol. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies which are shown to exist and to be efficient. Equilibrium proposals do not depend on th...
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作者：Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco; Reuben, Ernesto; van Winden, Frans
作者单位：University of Granada; Columbia University; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated players can lead to lower appropriative efforts and higher overall efficiency. With repeated interaction, appropriative efforts are considerably reduced because some groups manage to avoid fighting altoget...
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作者：Dittmann, Ingolf; Kuebler, Dorothea; Maug, Ernst; Mechtenberg, Lydia
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Technical University of Berlin; University of Mannheim; University of Hamburg
摘要：We perform an experiment in which subjects bid for participating in a vote. The setting precludes conflicts of interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have only instrumental reasons to vote and form correct beliefs. Yet, we find that experimental subjects are willing to pay for the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can only be account...
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作者：Melo, Emerson
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In this paper we study the problem of price competition and free entry in congested markets. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian Traffic Equilibrium to establish the existence and...
