Bucket auctions for charity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carpenter, Jeffrey; Holmes, Jessica; Matthews, Peter Hans
• 署名单位: Middlebury College; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.007
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 260-276
• 关键词: Charity auction; Fundraising; Charitable giving; experiment

摘要

Donations in-kind can be a mixed blessing for charities, who are often more adept at solicitation than resale. Many organizations rely on raffles to turn donations into cash, but auctions are also common. Theory predicts that all-pay mechanisms should produce more revenue than winner-pay mechanisms, but the empirical literature is thin and inconclusive. Drawing on both theoretical insights and behavioral intuition, we examine another all-pay mechanism, the bucket auction, and show that it generates more revenue than other standard mechanisms, both in theory and in the lab. We hope, therefore, that this format, and others like it, will attract the interest of fundraisers. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.